RACIALIZATION OF CITY SPACES THROUGH MORAL MONITORING IN ROTTERDAM, THE NETHERLANDS

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Abstract: The city of Rotterdam has had some of the strictest policing and security policies in the Netherlands. In public spaces, enforcement tactics have included such practices as preventative searches, as well as fines for individuals for hanging around in groups of three or more. This article explores the tactics used to enforce certain behaviours in public spaces that racialize city spaces. Further the author examines how other local urban occupants reinforce the ethnic and racial hierarchy of belonging in the Netherlands. The author uses situational analysis and in-situ ethnographic interviews as methods to engage difficult-to-access populations in situations of policing and security.

Keywords: policing of public spaces; sense of belonging; governmentality; hang-around youth; the Netherlands

Introduction

The neighbourhood had changed so much since I’ve grown up here. I appreciate the diversity but there are some things that really irk me. Sometimes, I think, the Turkish and Moroccan people who have moved to this country aren’t doing their best to integrate. And we don’t need that! Of course, this isn’t all of them that do this, but it only takes a few bad eggs to make the entire group seem like a problem. For example, my neighbour, she has had some trouble from the foreign youth who hang around in the playground here. The other day, she was walking
down the sidewalk with her shopping when they started yelling and harassing her, calling her names like “old, fat woman”. She was very upset about it. But I wouldn’t say that it’s all *allochthones*, just some of them (interview with Sabine, a white, ethnically Dutch woman, April 2010).

Sabine’s experience is like that of other majority community members in the Netherlands who feel unmoored by the changing demographic shifts to her neighbourhood. Her point that a few bad eggs create a problem for the whole group connects to what Dutch sociologist Willem Schinkel (2018) argued as the framing of immigrant integration as an individualized practice rather than a state-sponsored process. This framing blames the “misfits” for failing to integrate (Schinkel 2018, 2–3), and through the troublesome neocolonial practice of moral monitoring by ordinary citizens, results in the increased “visibility of [their] otherness” (ibid., 12).

Muslim immigrants from Turkey and Morocco, and importantly their children (often born and raised in the Netherlands), have become the focus of much of the moral monitoring due to the belief that these ethnic groups are insufficiently integrated (Schinkel 2018, 12), for example, lacking Dutch language proficiency and inter-ethnic social contact (Duyvendak et al. 2009, 15; see Schinkel 2018 for contrary evidence). However, Marguerite van den Berg and Willem Schinkel (2009) have argued that it is religious identity – specifically Muslim identity – that is seen as the main barrier to integration. In this discourse, the secularized (formerly Christian) and progressive Dutch nation is pitted against a close-minded Muslim interloper (Allievi 2005; Sunier 2010). Many in the media and in society-at-large tend to focus on outlier examples to represent Islam in the Netherlands, for example, on those imams who denounce homosexuality, the tolerance of which has come to be de rigueur in the Netherlands (Mepschen et al. 2010), or on the perceived oppression of Dutch Muslim women, signified by their wearing of headscarves in the free and open public spaces in the city (Herrera and Moors 2003). Islam, in the Netherlands, has been characterized as fanatical and intolerant, and Muslims (particularly Muslim male youths) as potentially violent. In the name of tolerance, then, the Dutch have become intolerant of certain ethnic and religious populations.

Wayne Modest and Anouk de Koning (2016) coined the term *anxious politics* to describe the “affectively charged narratives” which build cultural frames of reference about who belongs (and who does not) to the national imaginary (ibid., 100–101). Peddled by politicians seeking votes and media
seeking audiences, these anxieties “conjure up a restrictive and exclusionary model of national identity and belonging, which refutes and disciplines the presence of those defined as Other” (ibid., 99–100). Policymakers have codified this otherness into policies around “non-Western” immigrants concerning first- and second-generation Dutch Muslims with heritage from Turkey and Morocco. Saskia Bonjour and Jan Willem Duyvendak (2018) identified the discourse associated with “non-Western” immigrants from 2009 to 2012 as “the heydays of the immigrants with poor prospects” (ibid., 890). This discourse suggested “non-Western” immigrants had poor prospects because they were ultimately unassimilable and a burden to the social system due to their innate laziness, their lack of the education or skills to effectively participate in the economy, or their unwillingness to engender “a positive attitude toward Dutch society” (ibid., 890). Jan Willem Duyvendak, Menno Hurenkamp, and Evelien Tonkens (2010) coined the term the culturalization of citizenship to identify the increasing pressure placed on certain immigrants to culturally integrate into the majority community culture. Citizenship in the Netherlands today, then, is no longer just a matter of getting a job or acquiring legal status as a citizen. Instead, and as Dutch anthropologists have argued, becoming a Dutch citizen is now about following prescribed Dutch cultural norms and values while in the public and private spaces (see Duyvendak et al. 2016 for example).

Anthropologist Anouk de Koning (2015) argued that the result of such panic-driven politicking is an exceptional application of local policies that result in the over-policing of racialized individuals, particular “non-Western” immigrant and/or Muslim populations (see also Kaulingfreks 2015; Koch 2018). This article therefore provides insight into individuals’ experiences of policing in the Netherlands, focusing on the study of the securitization of public spaces in Rotterdam through ethnographic data collection. Specifically, I explore the

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As I have argued elsewhere (Long 2022), the category of “non-Western” immigrant is deeply problematic because of the racist and Orientalist connotations (Said 1978) associated with this term. My use of this term throughout the article is meant to highlight its importance as an immigration category (this “non-Western” category is still used by the national Statistics Bureau in the Netherlands, although it is under review, CBS, 2021) and where participants explicitly used it as an identity marker, in my field site. I acknowledge the limitations of this approach – using this term perpetuates the very ideologies that I am committed to addressing as a critical scholar. And yet, the use of this term highlights the connection made to the racist ideologies at work that features both national identity and immigrant otherness – with a particular focus on the othering of some immigrants (“non-Western”) over others. I have chosen to use “non-Western” immigrants as a category rather than even more problematic terms like allochthonous (see Yanow and van der Haar 2013) and used quotation marks as a designation to question its validity.
racialization of city spaces, and ways that other local occupants reinforce the ethnic and racial hierarchy of belonging.

The data for this work comes from ethnographic research I conducted in the Netherlands in 2009–2010 for my doctoral work. My goal was to better understand how populist politicians and the “constellation of social control professionals” (O’Neill and Loftus 2013, as cited in Mutsaers 2014, 842) sharpened their focus on Muslim belonging in the Netherlands and how these actors influenced everyday experiences among residents at the neighbourhood level. The bulk of my doctoral work focused on the exclusion of Dutch Muslims and Muslim immigrants from neighbourhood spaces through gentrification projects and interventionist government-support local programming in Rotterdam North (Long 2015, 2016, 2022). To gain a comparative perspective, I also conducted ethnographic walkabouts with a colleague in one of Rotterdam’s “notoriously” delinquent neighbourhoods (see de Koning 2015, 2016, 2017 for a similar methodological approach in Amsterdam’s infamous Diamantbuurt neighbourhood; or Kaulingfreks 2015 for the Kanaleneiland district of Utrecht). From our efforts, it became apparent that the policing of public space and the targeting of certain behaviours was used as a strategy to make non-conforming individuals more noticeable and more “governable”. The use of public space by racialized youth tended to be governed by an array of professionals in various capacities, including municipal police officers, local social workers, a patrol group made of youth hired from the local community to assuage nuisance for local residents.

In the next section, I describe the theoretical underpinnings of this article and provide a condensed immigration and security history of Rotterdam as it pertains to larger understandings of public space use in city designated “hot spots” for crime. Further, I explore situational analysis as a method to investigate topics of security and policing and follow this with a discussion and analysis of ethnographic material.

Policing Racialized Bodies in Public Spaces

Sinan Çankaya’s ethnography (2018) among police officers explores the convergence of racial, gendered, and class identity in policing practices in Amsterdam’s public spaces. Çankaya coined two important terms relative to this study. The first is urban allochthone, which he defines as “the urban poor: men from ethnicized and racialized minority groups, not-quite-white Central and Eastern
Europeans as well as some parts of the “white” working class, homeless people, and beggars” (2020, 703). The second is *geopolicing*, which he refers to as “the interconnections between geographic imaginations, representations, and practices of, in [his] case, police officers as to who, what, and where to police, and of course, why” (2018, 704). In his 2018 article, Çankaya documents the ways in which *urban allochthones* are racially profiled by police in public spaces, where they are seen to be out of place, namely, being in or moving through affluent white neighbourhoods. Even the means by which these *urban allochthones* are moving through space (e.g., in expensive cars) instigates a carding stop (asking these individuals for identification). In layering class and gender (males are stopped more often) profiling on top of racial identities, Çankaya’s approach enriches analyses exploring the racialization of urban spaces (for analyses of spatial segregation that prioritizes class identity, see Slater 2010; Wacquant 2010). As will be further described below, police and community officials use preconceived notions about racial, gender, and class identities when monitoring and regulating public spaces in my own field site. My own case study presents individuals’ experiences of policing in public space and the targeting of specific behaviours by certain racialized individuals (perceived “non-Western” youth) as a strategy for making non-conforming individuals more noticeable and more governable.

Dutch scholars Schinkel and van den Berg (2011) use Rotterdam’s Intervention Teams working in so-called “hotspots” as a case study to explore the “mix of prevention and repression, of assistance and control that amounts to an ensemble of techniques of governmentality targeting specific urban subpopulations” (1932; cf. Foucault 1979). This practice leads members from various social and government services to collaboratively intervene on behaviours, individuals, or households that are identified as “deviant” for the purpose of “increasing liveability” in the city through state-led gentrification (ibid.). The authors conclude that these interventions are made possible through the classification of an exceptional or emergency state – thus requiring intervention – that targets a “largely immigrant poor subpopulation”. These everyday practices result in government overreach and the potential suspension of rights for this subpopulation (Schinkel and van den Berg 2011, 1933).

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2 Citing the Rotterdam City Council (2005), Schinkel and van den Berg (2011) define hotspots as “one or more streets characterized by a cumulation of problems relating to physical environment, houses, and public space. In the social environment, social structures and healthy potential for individual and group development are lacking and, moreover, crime and nuisance are present” (ibid., 1918).
Schinkel and van den Berg’s (2011) case of Rotterdam’s Intervention Teams are a clear example of “plural policing”, which links various policing and/or security bodies with government officials (1920). These appending techniques embody “spatial governmentality”, where authorities seek to manage and control people in space through “the use of special spatial zones and rules of inclusion and exclusion”, and thus explore the relationship between space and power (Low 2017, 43–44). Francis Pakes (2004) has argued that the contemporary Dutch approach to crime should be understood as a “cultural-security complex” where the perceived threat is not to personal safety but to the very cultural fabric of society (ibid., 293). To address this broad goal, and as will be further discussed below, the Netherlands has taken “an integrated approach to security” where the state partners with schools, private security companies, social workers, and various local partners including cultural and religious centres (Pakes 2010; Kaulingfreks 2015, 106). Femke Kaulingfreks (2015) writes that when it comes to security mechanisms in the Netherlands, it is not just “Big Brother” but many younger siblings “who share the task of policing, monitoring, and indicating risk” (ibid., 106).

The policing and security strategies reiterate an understanding of who belongs (and who does not) to the imagined community of the Dutch nation through the securitization of perceived antisocial behaviours (enacted by the target population) in public spaces. The outcome of these practices is a “whitening” of Dutch public space (Low 2008), which emphasizes who and what behaviours represent a Dutch majority community and which disciplining practices work to create more “governable citizens” (Li 1999, 295). Specifically, I argue that “minor figures” (including social workers and various street-level security personnel) contribute to the visibility and policing of racialized (“non-Western” and/or Muslim) youth, as a technique of governmentality in which “citizens are taught to govern themselves and each other” (Koch 2018, 168). Peter Miller and Nikolas Rose (2008) describe “minor figures” as everyday workers (e.g., psychologists, medics, accountants, social workers, managers, town planners) whose “mundane knowledges, techniques, and procedures” are concerned with delineating “the norm and deviations from it” (ibid., 5, 6). As Miller and Rose

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3 Intervention teams include six to seven city officials (including police, social service workers, etc.) who enter residents’ homes to look around and determine the safety of the home, the legality of the residents, whether the residents are known to the city, who is entitled to public supports or should be fined for tax fraud, etc. (Schinkel and van den Berg 2011, 1919). The goal of these teams is to enhance the liveability of the city.
(2008) state: “It was only through these means that the ‘cold monster’ of the state could actually seek to shape the ways in which people conducted their daily lives, their interactions with themselves and others, and their relations with the various manifestations of social authority” (ibid., 6).

Unfortunately, such participatory policing has been shown to increase feelings of anxiety (instead of building feelings of safety) and acts of interpersonal surveillance among local residents (Pridmore et al. 2019). Indeed, as communal policing efforts grow, and policing practices diversify and proliferate among non-police personnel controlled by local governments (van Sluis et al. 2010), one can see evidence of Loïc Wacquant’s penal panopticism or, the constant and faceless approach to policing that identifies people and behaviours out of place (as cited in Kaulingfreks 2015, 112).

Miller and Rose’s work on “minor figures” informs this article, as the activities of the everyday workers help us “discern the web of relations and practices that result in particular ways of governing, particular ways of seeking to shape the conduct of individuals and groups” (2008, 7). In this way, we can see how state-led interventions are reinscribed and personalized, in everyday securing practices that reflect a moral monitoring of racialized (“non-Western” and/or Muslim) young men and their use of public spaces. Insa Lee Koch (2018) has persuasively argued that classism, racism, and ethnic prejudices play a role in these judgements and everyday policing practices that aligns with Çankaya’s (2018) and de Koning’s (2015) findings.

As will be described below in this case study, the categorization of behaviours such as hanging around on city sidewalks or parks is deemed problematic, resulting in the targeting of a largely immigrant, poor, subpopulation, which leads to heavy-handed policing and social interventions, the effect of which feeds into a hierarchy of belonging in Dutch society. In what follows, I provide a historical overview of certain security policies in Rotterdam to show how the focus on particular behaviours has become a conscious focus on specific groups.

**Policing Rotterdam’s Hotspot Neighbourhoods**

In the 1980s and 1990s, public safety policies in Rotterdam were like those of other Dutch cities and other large European cities. Crime did not feature prominently in Rotterdam politics until the mid-nineties, when drug-related crime, prostitution, and related practices became an issue in the neighbourhoods around the city centre (van Ostaaijen 2010). Crime prevention and public
safety policies during this period were a mixture of prevention and action determined on a case-by-case basis, in addition to increased surveillance in selected locations (van Sluis et al. 2010).

According to Dutch criminologist Rene van Swaaningen (2007), during this time Rotterdam’s officials followed an “integral” (or integrative) approach to safety, using an ad hoc, multi-agency approach to address specific urban problems as they arose (ibid., 245). This approach supplemented repressive measures by the police, for example, with preventative measures delivered through other civil society stakeholders, such as government officials, local businesses, or neighbourhood groups (van Ostaaijen 2010, 75–77; ibid., 211–214). This integrative approach to public safety policy also sought to address fear of crime and feelings of insecurity among Rotterdam inhabitants as a way of encouraging community support for urban and social renewal programs in Rotterdam (van Swaaningen 2005, 291). Thus, local participation in the security processes was an apparatus of security.

Starting in the early 2000s, attention began to focus increasingly on Rotterdam’s “non-Western” immigrant populations following the release of a report by the Statistics Netherlands (CBS) predicting that so-called problematic neighbourhoods (“hotspots”) in Rotterdam would have majority populations of such residents by 2017 (Kerkstra 2006). This projection caused public concern (see Modest and de Koning 2016 for “anxious politics” above) because members of this group had a higher presence in crime statistics, were more likely on average to be on welfare than their white ethnically Dutch peers, and as mentioned above, were thought to be poorly integrated into Dutch society. The idea that the city had reached its tipping point (in certain neighbourhoods) gained acceptance, and the city council released the report Rotterdam Presses On: The Way to a Balanced City in 2003 (as cited in van Ostaaijen 2010, 122). This official report called for some controversial policies, such as requiring “non-Western” immigrants to earn 120% of the minimum wage to settle in certain neighbourhoods that already had a high concentration of “non-Western” immigrant inhabitants and allowing police and government officials to close buildings with frequent disturbances (ibid., 122).

Targeting those communities that were considered “problematic” remained an important theme with the initiation of a series of youth programs that focused on addressing the problem of hangjongeren (“hang-around”, or loitering, male youths) (van Lieshout and Aarts 2008). Youth tended to hang around in city parks or on street corners, and the police and municipal
authorities saw their behaviour as creating social nuisance (Rotterdam 2009a). Those who loiter on sidewalks and on street corners are in general seen to be associated with drug trafficking and criminality (Baillergeau and Hoijtink 2010; Lindo 2010).

The act of hanging around in public spaces also goes against the behaviours set out for “good citizens”. In the Dutch context, anthropologist Martijn Koster defines a “good citizen” as someone who is actively engaged in their neighbourhood for the good of larger society; a bad citizen is passive or irresponsible (2012). Thus, loitering youth are seen as irresponsible bad citizens in the eyes of the Dutch “majority”. To address youth identified as the typical perpetrators of such activities, the city developed action programs, including the so-called Antillean Approach, which involved hiring a city marine to deal exclusively with Antillean youth. All youths signed up for this program were required to be either employed, in school, or in a judiciary program (van Ostaaijen 2010, 123). A Moroccan Approach was later developed with a purpose to slow the rate of habitual criminal behaviour by providing family coaches, homework assistants, and case managers to help Moroccan youth find work, internships, or housing (van Ostaaijen 2010, 172).

One policy that some considered controversial was the institution of “preventative searches” (preventief fouilleren) of individuals or automobiles for concealed weapons. The searches, carried out at the discretion of police officers, were introduced into law in 2002 in reaction to an increase in violent crimes with a weapon (Rotterdam 2009b). There were three official objectives for these searches: (1) securing firearms and initiating criminal prosecution against illegal handling of such weapons, (2) increasing the perceived safety and security of citizens and trust in the police and government, and (3) making illegal gun ownership less attractive (Rotterdam 2009b).

These searches, however, could only be conducted in “high-risk neighbourhoods” (veiligheidsrisicogebieden) so designated by the mayor for a specific length of time (van Swaaningen 2007, 242; Rotterdam 2010). The mayor’s decision was based on data and police experiences perceived as suggesting

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4 Antillean immigrants and their descendants are also classified as “non-Western” immigrants, but while Antillean youth have and continue to be associated with crime (van Ostaaijen 2010), their identity is seen to be less at odds with greater Dutch society (Slootman 2018).

5 There is evidence of police profiling Muslims, minorities, and lower-income youths (the majority of whom in Rotterdam are categorized as “non-Western” immigrants) during security enforcement (ECRI 2008; Eijkman 2010).
increased risk. Announcements in the local newspapers and in the neighbourhood informed residents of the impending period of permitted searches. Security officers (police or other designated groups) were permitted to open packages and conduct vehicle and bodily searches for weapons or ammunition. In 2010, the year in which I conducted research on these searches, there were four main designated security risk areas: Delfshaven, the city-centre (Centrum), Vloemhof/Hillesluis, and Rotterdam-Zuid, in which there were seven search periods in 2009–2011 (Rotterdam 2009b). In total, since 2004, there has been a 33% decrease in the recovery of firearms and 2,700 weapons (firearms and otherwise) have been seized (Rotterdam 2009b).

Although these searches were a source of controversy throughout the country, they became increasingly frequent. By the end of 2005, more than 40,000 people had been preventatively frisked and 10,000 cars had been searched (van Ostaaijen 2010, 118). Yet, according to the municipal government’s website, preventative searches are fully accepted by the majority of the population and there is “a lot” of willingness to participate in such actions (Rotterdam 2009b). According to the report, 88% of the population believes that preventative searches improve feelings of safety and 76% of those searched are satisfied with their treatment by the police during these procedures (Rotterdam 2009b). The report attributes the positive nature of these experiences to the precise and professional manner in which searches are carried out.

The searching of bodies and governance of behaviours in public spaces are tactics used to discipline the body and govern actions for the purpose of reproducing a particular kind of behaviour. Yet this apparatus of security does more than just physically police public places; it also creates a specific kind of perception about who is considered dangerous and feeds into a discourse about belonging. Although Erin Martineau (2006) suggests that white Dutch youths hanging around in public places draw an equally negative reaction from the authorities as do racialized youths (“non-Western” immigrant, second generation, and/or Muslim) engaging in the same behaviour, this same research confirms that hanging around and being a nuisance is generally linked to ethnic diversity and is frequently perceived as an “allochthonous behaviour”. Martineau explains, “when I told people that I was studying the problems with hangjongeren (“hang-around youth”), many, if not most, first assumed that I was studying ethnic minority youth, partly because problems with those youth
are so much the object of academics, journalists, policymakers, and the various organs of the social welfare state” (2006, 276). Martineau goes on to write that the abstract image of who was a hang-around youth was most often identified as problematic “ethnic minority youth”, always in public places, and represented larger issues of lack of integration and failures of failed immigration policies (2006, 276). Martineau’s work aligns with Çankaya’s (2018) broader description of *urban allochthones* (see above).

This image is supported by the language of politicians, who have used such terms as “Moroccan scum” (*straattuig*) and “street terrorists” (*straatterroristen*) (Koemans 2010a, 208) to describe Moroccan teenagers who hang around on street corners and commit petty crimes. In this way, politicians – from both left and right-wing parties – have associated antisocial behaviour on the streets as being a problem of minorities and, in particular, a problem of Moroccan youth; the cause of this antisocial behaviour is believed to have resulted from (Dutch) Moroccans’ low level of social integration into society (Koemans 2010b, 485). Politicians have also argued that there is a need to address all antisocial behaviour with strong policing measures to “break the cycle of isolation and alienation” that are thought to plague these “young immigrants” so that they understand that “this kind of behaviour is not accepted in the Netherlands” (Koemans 2010b, 485–486). Implicit in these comments is the understanding that Moroccan youth, who are described as “immigrants” despite most being born and raised in the Netherlands (but who have a parent who has immigrated to the Netherlands from Morocco), are outsiders to the imagined community of the Netherlands or at the very least, not acting in a Dutch way.

Such discourses contribute to the wider understanding of Moroccan male youths as dangerous individuals who do not positively contribute to, or are a part of, Dutch society. The association of the behaviour of hanging around in public places with Dutch Moroccan and Turkish youths reframes these individuals as dangerous and peripheral members in Dutch society contributing negatively to an already problematic identity category. To show how this process works – how individuals experience these disciplining tactics and how they in turn facilitate or contest such governance by the police and political officials – I now turn to ethnographic examples of preventative searches carried out in a “high-risk” area of Rotterdam, followed by several ethnographic interviews with local police and community officials.
Situational Analysis as a Method to Explore Disciplinary Tactics in High-Risk Neighbourhoods

I conducted research on security measures in Rotterdam by walking around “hot spots” in highly policed neighbourhoods in Rotterdam’s city centre in the spring of 2010. I walked and approached individuals to discuss their experiences of policing in public spaces, with a friend and colleague, C. B., who was living locally, in her twenties, who spoke fluent Dutch, and helped facilitate our discussions. C. B. was also interested in learning more about ideas of safety and security measures in these neighbourhoods, as a local resident. We both presented as young white women and I was most likely identified as ethnically Dutch until I spoke, when my own immigrant identity was revealed. Over a period of 4 months, C. B. and I would walk around Nieuwe Westen (New West), a neighbourhood close to the city centre in the borough of Delfshaven, approximately once a week in the late afternoon or early evening (spanning 2–4 hours). We chose different paths to walk through the neighbourhood, but always visited the same large open spaces (plein), typically found in the centre of condensed (social) housing (e.g., Tideman Square). We would hang out in local neighbourhood spaces designed for congregation (e.g., on benches, tables, seating areas), and while there, ask individuals about their experiences of security and policing in that space. We conducted approximately 12 ethnographic in-situ interviews\(^6\) over this period.

Collecting ethnographic insights within significant spaces has growing support among anthropologists and social scientists who are interested in understanding “people’s historical and contemporary relationships with local environments” (Strang 2010, 132; for a discussion on ethnographic walking and sensory memories, see Alda 2017). This approach allows individuals to

\(^6\) I define ethnographic interviews using Elizabeth Munz’s definition: “An ethnographic interview is an informal interview that takes place in a naturalistic setting and is often the result of participant observation” (2017, 455). During, these informal interviews and conversations that occurred during our walkabouts, we placed an importance on asking individuals to describe their experiences of security and being governed or policed in public places, in the spaces themselves to evoke feedback. Often, participants would gesture to spaces in their immediate vicinity to discuss past events, and allowed us, for example, to catch reflections and thoughts on policing events as they occurred in real-time. This methodological approach was taken due to the nature of the events we were investigating and the securitization surrounding them. This approach provides an opportunity to gain important information that is often difficult to get a hold of. C. B. and I began each interview with a short synopsis of who we were and our individual interests in this research.
reflect on the space, its cultural beliefs and values, as a repository and mnemonic of information (Strang 2010, 132). It was during one of these evenings on the square that my colleague and I saw the arrest of two hang-around youth and subsequently gathered insights from local residents present at the time. This arrest event will be analysed as a “social situation” (as per Gluckman 1940) to gain a sense of how policing of public spaces in Rotterdam are experienced (and policed) from multiple perspectives.

Karen Sykes (2014) describes the anthropological “case study method” as a part of situational analysis of the ways in which events may shed light on how “different conflictive perspectives on them are enjoined in the same social system” (ibid., par. 2). The case study reflected below would be identified as one of Max Gluckman’s social situations which is “a collocation of events which the analyst is able to construe as connected with one another and which take place in a relatively restricted time span” (Mitchell 2009, 171). The use of situational analysis provided unique insight into the practice of policing and perceptions of youth deviance in public spaces. As two white, female-presenting individuals with non-native accents, asking questions and walking and hanging around in public space (the latter act being the behaviour we had come to explore further) allowed us to become a part of the context we explored, as participant observers. To provide greater context to the policing and community perspectives of such events, this event analysis is followed by an overview of in-situ ethnographic interviews with ten local policing and community officials. To support the improvised and in-situ nature of this data collection, I complement my data and analysis with materials from scholars who conducted similar research, i.e., neighbourhood policing of racialized youth in the Netherlands (see Martineau 2006; Bonnet and Caillault 2015; de Koning 2015, 2016, 2017).

At the time of my fieldwork project, in 2010, there were approximately 18,962 persons living in Nieuwe Westen, 72% of who were identified as “non-Western” Muslim migrants and their families. Twenty-three percent of the housing in this neighbourhood was subsidized housing, the percentage of lower income residents was approximately 60%, and the rate of unemployment was 10% (well above the city average) (Centrum voor Onderzoek en Statistiek 2010). According to the Safety Index of 2010 (which measures the level of safety from the previous year, 2009), Nieuwe Westen is in the “threatened category”, meaning it was a neighbourhood that would receive special attention under the 2010–2014 safety action plan.
Experiencing Disciplinary Tactics and Governance in High-Risk Neighbourhoods

The field note entry below concerns an evening in May 2010 on Tideman Square, when C. B. and I witnessed an arrest that included a preventative search:

Two policemen on bikes had stopped and were searching the bags and pockets of two male youths. The police began radioing to colleagues and arrested the young men. At this point, other youths from the area became interested in the situation and a group of about ten youths began approaching the scene. As one police officer stayed with the two alleged offenders, the other police officer barred the approaching group from the scene. One of the youths tried to get closer; however, the police officer (a man) appeared angry, and while saying something to the youth, put a hand against the youth’s chest to stop his advancement. Another approaching youth stepped out onto the street and started filming the scene with a mobile phone.

The two youths were then handcuffed, and the officers made them kneel down on the ground. The two young girls sitting next to us and also watching the scene exclaimed, “Why do the police do that? It is not necessary. They are already handcuffed! You do not have to have them kneel down”. An unmarked car arrived at the scene and three men (one with a badge around his neck but in plain clothes) got out and stepped aggressively between the two police and the surrounding group of young men on the sidewalk. At this point the two youths were kneeling on the sidewalk with the two arresting officers in front of them. The three security men stood between this foursome and the growing group of youths on the street corner. Two police buses arrived next, and the original arresting officers (who were on bicycles) placed the two youths in one of the buses, which then drove them away. The youths in the back of the bus smiled and waved, with handcuffed hands, to the group of teenagers at the corner.

Following their departure, many individuals on this side of the square (an open square intended for public use) had come to the corner to watch what was happening. While the group of young men walked around the street corner where the event had taken place, most of the women and young girls remained on the square, which was slightly raised from the sidewalk and enclosed by a waist-high fence. This vantage point, as C. B. and I were also on the square, allowed for a clear view of the events unfolding below.

After witnessing this arrest, C. B. and I took the opportunity to speak to some of the other women on the playground area, who were speaking Arabic
and wearing headscarves. I asked the women “Does that happen often?” One woman answered, “No, not all the time but often enough”. We introduced ourselves and asked the ladies whether it was safe in the area. “No”, the women said collectively. Then one woman, who looked to be in her early forties and who was wearing a headscarf, took the lead and answered the rest of our questions while the others followed our conversation:

Woman: There is not enough police presence here to combat the youth problem. [...]
C. B.: Do they conduct preventative searches here?
Woman: Yes, the police do preventative searches. They stand on either side of the sidewalk of one of the streets and stop everybody that wants to walk through, including women and older people. It’s never happened to me. When I see them, I take a different street. When we meet here on the square, we often talk about safety. [...] Before, everything [in the neighbourhood] was safer. [But now] more police presence is needed to improve the situation. It is not safe for women to walk outside here at night. It is not possible. We just stay inside.

This group of women reiterated the idea that youths were a threat to neighbourhood safety. In this woman’s opinion, problematic behaviour can be attributed to insufficient police presence. It also seems that these women approve police searching tactics to combat the “youth problem”, even though preventative measures, such as searches, affect them as well. The idea that these youths commit crimes is propagated not only by policing or government officials but also by residents of the neighbourhood.

My colleague and I then approached another group, on the same square, who were speaking Turkish. We began by asking the group if it was safe in this neighbourhood, to which one woman who looked to be in her fifties responded that it was generally safe except for a few problems, namely teenage boys hanging out, smoking cigarettes or marijuana, showing their attitude to others, and intimidating the younger boys.

Although we had just witnessed a search at the other end of the square, this woman also stated that she had never witnessed a search herself. Instead, she spoke of the importance of increasing the presence of “policing authorities” (toezicht van de gemeente) and went on to state that “the problem is that they [motioning to the group of women that we had just come from] have 14 kids and then abandon them on [the] street without watching over them. I don’t want to
point at certain people, but they have too many kids to keep them all at home”. This response incorporates perceptions around lower socioeconomic status (lack of adequate housing) and inadequate parenting. As noted above, the group of women she was referring to would typically be identified as Muslims because they were wearing headscarves. They would likely be identified as Moroccans because their clothing would be popularly associated with someone who had emigrated from rural Morocco, i.e., long dresses and dark overcoats.

Notably, these respondents agreed that the threats to security came from a lack of police presence and from youths’ behaviour of hanging about (while smoking, yelling, making messes, and loitering) on street corners. It is noteworthy that the views of the speaker from the second group are again in line with the official discourses that youths are the source of trouble due to their hanging around in public spaces. It is also significant that speakers from both groups attribute a lack of economic integration or suitable social activity, as a lack of responsibility as proper and/or working citizen (see Koster 2012).

Speakers from these two groups disagreed on certain points, however, when discussing the night’s events and the general level of safety of the area. First, among the women in the neighbourhood, there seemed to be disagreement on whether it was a safe place. The speakers also disagreed on whether there were enough things for youths to do and what sorts of services were available for them. The speaker from the second group seemed to imply that criminal or bad behaviour was a choice on the part of the youth because, according to her, there were ample opportunities in the neighbourhood. Secondly, while the speaker from one group spoke more generally in assigning fault to the parents for their sons’ behaviour, the speaker from the second group pointed to Moroccan women, or possibly those perceived as Muslim women, when assigning blame for children’s upbringing.

The material from this case study aligns with other work in this area, particularly the work of anthropologist Anouk de Koning, who explores the role of collective responsibility of the community and in particular, the family, in intervening in antisocial or criminal behaviour of male youth in the Netherlands (2016). For example, de Koning interviews Nadia, a mother in her thirties, about a highly publicized and violent event featuring two Moroccan youth from the local community. Nadia describes her shock to learn of the event because “they have real good parents [...] As I just said, parents can no longer control a boy of 18, 19. Mothers don’t know everything that happens in the streets, what kind of stuff their children get up to” (de Koning 2016, 120). Importantly,
local residents in both cases identify “the street” as a dangerous space, and a place that is out of reach for parents, whose responsibility it is to intervene in antisocial or criminal behaviour. If the space is considered dangerous, this might lead locals (and beyond) to support the policing of targeted individuals, in these spaces. Indeed, Koch’s work acknowledges this paradox, that those most affected by increased police presence, also want more police presence (2018). This last discourse aligns with the official narratives of the kinds of mothers and sons who need social and civic support (see Martineau 2006, 71; van den Berg and Schinkel 2009, 173).

Finally, the two speakers disagreed on the matter of preventative searches with the speaker from the second group denying having witnessed any. Although a search had been conducted not 30 minutes earlier on the north side of the square, this group was seated on the southern side and perhaps did not witness the event. These divergences of opinion are notable because they illustrate how lived experiences of safety and security on the square are as unique as the individuals who experience them. And it should also be overtly stated that the identities of the researchers – white, middle-class women, speaking Dutch – certainly affected the responses we received from those witnessing the event. As individuals most likely outside the purview of police scrutiny and most likely aligning with the image of community or state officials, it is important to acknowledge the potential limitations of collecting responses in this manner.

**Who’s to blame?**

From our walkabouts over several months, it became apparent that this square had significance for local youth despite it being a policed space. For example, on another night (June 2010) on the same square (Tideman Square), C. B. and I had the chance to speak with a larger group of male youths who identified themselves as “Moroccans”. I asked them if they had any encounters with the police and if so, why they occurred. “The problem”, one youth said, “seemed to be the act of hanging out in public spaces but we’re not doing anything other than hanging out and being bored”. The youth went on to describe a preventative search that happened on the square about one year earlier. When describing it, the youth used words such as *inval* (“invasion” or “intrusion”). “The police came at us from all sides, blocking the ways out and cordon off the square. When the square was secured, the police began an extensive body search of all the young males there”. The youths went on to say that the police do identity
checks more often than searches and that they drive by the square in cars, taking pictures of those who are hanging around. They also spoke about being fined 90 euros for hanging out in groups of more than three people in public places. According to them, the fine had been introduced only a few months earlier. We asked them if they felt safe in this area, one youth replied, “Why should we not feel safe? We’re the ones that are supposed to be the problem!” to which another youth answered, “It was only people like them [motioning to the rest of the group] who are policed” and then hesitantly he added the word *allochthon* (he emphasised this word). A third youth spoke up: “[We] are actually Dutch but they don’t see us as Dutch. They don’t treat us that way”. When we asked them how they felt about these security controls, one youth answered, “They [the police] should not do any of it […]. They make things worse and make us feel unwelcome”.

The youths we spoke with were conscious of being singled out by police measures, as well as by the reactions of others to them when in public spaces. It is evident that they recognized that they were not believed to belong to the majority community, as per their self-identification as “the problematic group”, who are often checked by the police. It is notable that these youth felt comfortable identifying with Rotterdam as their city rather than with the Netherlands as their country. Throughout my research, this narrative ran through many of my conversations with racialized youth. Further, a connection between “not doing anything” runs counter to discourses of productivity and/or active citizenry in the neoliberal economy. In Çankaya’s terms, the act of these supposedly hypermasculine men hanging around in public is experienced as “hijacking or disrupting the city’s spaces” where pro-active policing interventions (requests to see identification without resulting in arrest) result in collecting data on these individuals and making them “known to the police” and of reinforcing the power hierarchy between wielders of state power and citizens (2018, 715–716).

From the above experiences, it is notable that despite the repeated governance, this square (Tideman Square) was interpreted as an “allochthonous space” by both the users (when, for example, the youth described it as a space that their white Dutch friends from school would not come to) and by the authorities (who attempted to control that space). That is, despite the police and security presence and despite knowing that hanging around in public places was an undesirable behaviour that brought penalties (searches or fines, for example), these youth continued to hang around in this public place. None of the youth described this behaviour as an act of resistance; they explained it as just hanging
around. To them, this was an innocent act resulting from their circumstances (having nothing to do), yet one that was policed. The governing actions of police did not deter them from using public space as far as we could tell, because for these youths, it was a matter of having nothing else to do.

Again, there is a connection from these findings that have been found in Anouk de Koning’s (2016) work. For example, her interview with a young woman in her twenties, corroborates the youths’ experiences of racial profiling. Miriyam “blamed the overzealous policing for young men’s criminal activities” stating “I don’t blame these guys if they start breaking and entering in protest” (2016, 120). Miriyam’s explanation of events – as a protest to racial profiling – opens the possibility to consider these spatial practices as a means to contest space. Setha Low and Denise Lawrence-Zúñiga (2003) define contested space as “those sites where conflicts in the form of opposition, confrontation, subversion, and resistance engage actors often with differential access to power and resources” (ibid., 18). The youths’ repeated (so-called) misuse of local spaces, then – what de Certeau (1984) would describe as spatial “tactics” to exercise their agency – could be understood as an effort to fight for alternative ways of using local spaces. However, when Miriyam was reminded that the youths were being charged for more serious crimes than breaking and entering, she quickly excluded them from the community: “I don’t know whether that really has anything to do with the neighbourhood. Those guys simply go for the big money, and they happen to live here and then this neighbourhood gets the stigma” (de Koning 2016, 120). This practice of policing youth “in place” highlights Wacquant’s “territorial stigmatization of the poor” where “stigmatization is part and parcel of the ‘problematization’ that allows for the construction of an object of intervention” (as cited in Schinkel and van den Berg 2011, 1927). These narratives of non-belonging, immigrant identities, and racially profiled youth “having nothing to do” also surfaced in our in-situ ethnographic interviews with policing and community officials from the same neighbourhood.

“Minor Figures” and the Policing of City Spaces

In late May 2010, C. B. and I came across two Rotterdam-Rijmond police, one older and one younger, who were walking along Vierambachtstraat, one of the main streets in the Delfshaven district. After asking if we could speak with them about safety in the area, we asked them how long they had been working in this district. The older officer, who had been working there for 20 years, replied that
things had gotten better in terms of drugs, prostitution, and violence, as these were “no longer big security issues” in the area. He emphasized the importance of preventative searches, which in his view “got the weapons off the street”, a narrative that aligns to Rotterdam’s official policies. The officer also identified “waves of immigration” as the prominent source of neighbourhood problems, in particular the arrival of the Moluccans in the 1970s and the Surinamese who followed. In response to the contemporary, local Moluccan and Surinamese population, the officer stated: “They adapted well and they’re no longer having any troubles”. He continued by identifying local Moroccan and Turkish youths as the current immigrant population (it should be noted that most youth are second generation – see demographic information above) having trouble finding their place in Dutch society. He added that this “current trouble” would likely give way to the next wave of immigrants, which he identified as “probably being the Polish and Afghanis”.

The police officer’s statements are interesting in that he identified security issues as a symptom of newly arrived immigrants who have not yet adapted or learned the proper behaviour in public spaces. Such problematic behaviour would be quelled following a period of integration and socialization – “finding one’s place” in society. For him, the need for integration was not permanent, but rather a phase one that would be passed onto the next wave of immigrants. It would appear that, at least from the perspective of this seasoned policeman, particular groups of male youths were not innately criminal; they needed governing for a limited period.

In a cross-country comparison of how police talk about minorities, François Bonnet and Clotilde Caillault interviewed 55 police officers from the Netherlands, France, and Italy (2015). They argue that unlike the French police officers in their study, Dutch officers overtly associated trouble in neighbourhoods with Moroccan youth, stating: “Not every allochthon is bad, but the most troubles on the street, when you talk about theft, robbery… most of the time, it’s an ‘allochthon’” (Dutch police officer 8, as cited in Bonnet and Caillault 2015, 1,190). Or when Dutch police office 10 stated: “It’s like a disease, I guess the whole community of that people, 90% is wrong, 10% is okay, people that want to work, the same who want to be the same as the Dutch people” (as cited in Bonnet and Caillault 2015, 1191). This pathologizing of criminality among Moroccan youth is contrary to the structural explanation of the overrepresentation of ethnic groups in crime, where – as described in our own encounter – police officers associated crime as a social rather than
cultural (innate) problem. French officers in Bonnet and Caillault’s study describe the role of poverty, spatial relegation, and the resulting discontent as reasons why racialized youth are overrepresented in crime statistics (2015, 1195). Importantly, none of the officers interviewed mentioned racial profiling as a reason for overrepresentation.

Local policing efforts also include other safety officers such as the StadsWacht (City Guards). In June 2010, C. B. and I spoke with City Guard officers on Heemraadsplein, which is an open expanse on the edge of Delfshaven. These guards are not police officers but provide extra security presence on the streets of “high-risk” areas. Their powers include holding and searching individuals, imposing fines for infractions, using handcuffs if individuals are found in violation of the law, and making arrests on behalf of the police. These officers respond not only to threats to public safety but also to tax and environmental infractions. The two officers we spoke with again mentioned that their ethnic background as second-generation Dutch Muslim youth was an important factor in their recruitment for the position. One of the City Guard officers stated that although he considered himself to be an “allochthon” (his phrasing), he had grown up as a “Dutch youth” (Nederlandse jongere) in a stereotypically Dutch neighbourhood. Now that he had moved to the area where he worked, however, he knew the area and the other youths better. When asked what things they typically dealt with, when out on patrol, both officers mentioned hangjongeren in public spaces, particularly in front of convenience and food stores. According to one of the City Guard officers, they considered themselves to be “easier-going on the youths’ infractions” than other enforcement officers, a factor which, according to them, garnered them more respect in the eyes of the youth. Although they were already working as law enforcement officers, these young men said that their motivations for taking on this position were to get a future job in law enforcement, and in the meantime, to make a little money.

It is interesting that these young men upheld security measures targeting youths who were perceived to have similar social and cultural identities as themselves. Notably, despite identifying themselves as “allochthonous”, these City Guard officers used the same discourse and rhetoric to describe nuisances and problematic behaviour in public spaces (namely nuisances from the hangjongeren), as those found in official policing and media narratives.

On another occasion, C. B. and I spoke with a youth worker in his early thirties, named Shibal in June 2010. Shibal was walking around on Mathenesserplein, which is an open plane surrounded by three busy streets
and includes a sitting area with benches. There was frequent police presence in this space, and it had a busy feel (i.e., it is more heavily populated, and noise from traffic and music from businesses can be heard). He was trying to get the youth hanging around the square to come inside to his centre so that “they could stay out of trouble”. Although Shibal was able to organize one activity a month, there were typically few other organized opportunities for the youth in between these times. He said, “people are bored, and it’s a problem that they have nothing to do”. He spoke about trying to encourage the youth to try and use the neighbourhood centres, but that their location was not advantageous, being far for some of the youth, and that youth (in general) preferred to be outside. “Even so”, he said, “these activities are still more than they had before because there was absolutely nothing about five to ten years ago”.

Shibal was a self-proclaimed one-time hangjongere himself until he became involved with this local Moroccan foundation for youth. His job was to be a resource for the local youths, organize activities, and get the youths more involved with the Centre. Shibal told us that his brother was also a youth worker, and our conversation turned to Shibal’s Moroccan background and how it affected his decision to become a youth worker. “I was born and raised in Delfshaven and this helps me connect to the youth here. It also makes my work important because I am able to connect with many of the youth who also have Moroccan heritage”.

The cases of Shibal and the City Guard officers illustrate how members of the community “in this case not only residents of the neighbourhood but members of the racialized [“non-Western” immigrant and/or Muslim community] are recruited to participate in official roles to stop racialized youth from hanging around in public spaces, as part of Rotterdam’s approach to addressing youth crime. It is notable that in the latter two cases, all the workers believed that their heritage worked to their advantage when enforcing security and safety measures in public spaces in the eyes of the youth. Despite these individuals’ empathetic approach to policing and community safety for racialized youth, their answers to our questions integrated dominant, negative discourses about the public behaviour of hang-around youth. Again, it is worth noting here that these responses could be shaped by the white-presenting identities of the researchers.

These examples also demonstrate that governance of public spaces takes various forms and is conducted by a diversity of individuals. Despite its diversity, all forms of securing this space (the police with preventative searches, the City
Guard officers and their ability to impose fines, and even social workers like Shibal, who seek to get youths involved in more “appropriate behaviours”), work to move racialized/targeted youth inside and away from public viewing/space. With respect to the use of public spaces, there is a consistent understanding that hanging around on sidewalks and street corners is discouraged. In response, such policing and community efforts to identify “offending bodies” and demarcate their difference as being “out of place” reinforces the “visibility of otherness” through their racial, classed, and gendered beliefs about who and what actions are appropriate in local public squares. The fact that this act of “reinforcing otherness” is happening in what would typically be identified as a racialized space (due to demographics of the neighbourhood) is important, and adds to the literature showcasing the process of racializing otherness within and on the boundaries of affluent, white neighbourhoods (see Çankaya, 2020). These policing actions work to “whiten public space” by dictating appropriate behaviours that align with majority community understandings of the proper use of public spaces, and by removing (from view or through arrest) racialized bodies (Hill 2008; Low 2008; Anderson 2015). Consequently, these securitizing actions are supposed to make these spaces safer.

Miller and Rose’s (2008) take on governmentality focuses on “the engineering of conduct and the normalizing of behaviour [...] which demonstrated the important normalizing role played by a vast array of petty managers of social and subjective existence” (ibid., 5). Such an approach moves the frame of investigation from governing projects to governing processes, which allows the powers that be to govern at all (Miller and Rose 2008, 5). As demonstrated in the above ethnographic interviews of policing officials, policing tactics directed toward typically immigrant, impoverished subpopulations in public places are some of the everyday acts by “minor” figures to discipline deviant behaviour and recalibrate public spaces according to dominant perceptions of the social norm (see also, Koch 2018).

By using in-situ ethnographic interviews and participating in hanging around in the public spaces that were officially governed, it became apparent that only certain bodies were noticed and policed. Importantly, neither my colleague nor I were ever stopped and asked for identification, despite demonstrating the same sort of behaviour as these youth (i.e., hanging around). This fact most likely has racialized and gendered implications in Dutch public spaces. The experiences described in this article brought together two threads of discussion. First, individuals make active choices of how to use space regardless of
normative conceptions of how public spaces should be used. This is evident in the youths’ continued hanging around in public places despite the repercussions. Second, in the context of the Netherlands, to understand how space is governed, one must also understand officials’ efforts to integrate targeted racialized Dutch Muslim and/or “non-Western” immigrant populations into Dutch society. Kaulingfreks’ work (2015) supports such an analysis; he argued that Foucault’s panopticon has moved into Dutch public places to carefully monitor racialized male youth, who are “singled out, dragged from the shadows and made accountable” (2015, 112). Yet, it is not just the state-enforced authorities to whom they are being held accountable, but also the constellation of social control professionals and other local inhabitants.

This article explored the tactics used to enforce certain behaviours in public spaces that racialize city spaces. Çankaya’s work around the geopolicing of urban allochthones who are racialized, classed, and gendered as out of place in white, upper-class spaces, lends an important insight into the intersections of racial, class, and gender identities in the monitoring and imagining of the proper uses of public spaces. In the context of “hot spots” and the policing of young, racialized, male youths, it became apparent from this situational analysis that it was not only the police or “minor figures” (such as community workers or non-police security personnel controlled by local governments), but also local residents who reinforced the “visibility of otherness” through their racial, classed, and gendered beliefs about who and what was appropriate in local public squares.

**Conclusion**

In this article, I explored how certain security and safety programs in Rotterdam, like preventative searches or the fining of individuals for gathering in groups of three or more people, can work to reinforce a sense of belonging in public spaces that predominantly discriminates against young racialized male teenagers. These policing programs also work to reiterate and maintain dominant conceptions of how public spaces should be used in everyday life. Security and accompanying civilizing programs (e.g., the Moroccan Approach) while aiming to reduce fear among the general populace, result in Moroccan male youths being made to feel as if they do not belong on Rotterdam’s streets or in their neighbourhoods.

Through an exploration of the use of public squares, the above ethnographic material helped illuminate the web of relations and practices that resulted from
particular ways of governing and shaping of conduct. As was made apparent, it was not only policing tactics by law enforcement officials, but also the actions of ordinary inhabitants living in hotspot neighbourhoods who helped reproduce discourses concerning problematic behaviour associated with racialized male youths. Also visible in the discourse of disciplining the behaviour of hanging around in public places is the idea that these youth should become active, employed citizens and thus show their loyalty to the Dutch nation. Because they had nothing else to do, these individuals, purposefully or not, were seen to be misusing space and possibly avoiding their responsibilities as productive citizens. More research on the economic factors associated with “hang-around youth” \( (hangjongeren) \) would help to shed light on these perceptions.

**Acknowledgements:** The author would like to thank the editor and two anonymous referees who kindly reviewed earlier versions of this manuscript and provided valuable suggestions and feedback.

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