BEYOND DUTCH BORDERS: A NATION IN TIMES OF EUROPEANIZATION

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Abstract: *Each categorization in population statistics has a bias. Sometimes they deflate and sometimes they expand populations that merit public policy concern. This article discusses the political consequences of policy choices in that respect: notably by the example of Dutch population statistics and the representation of the "allochtoon." The "allochtoon" (being of foreign origin) was a benevolent creation for it should facilitate monitoring the effects of integration policies. Part of these was easy naturalization. This meant the loss of "nationality" as a statistical marker. Including the migrants' offspring furthermore rendered "immigrant" useless. However, creating the "allochtoon" also has had unexpected inflationary effects; notably in the public's perception. First of all, this effect results from the inclusion of the second generation. Secondly: integration polices are exclusively aimed at "allochtonen" with a non-Western background, yet statistical reproduction usually includes all, i.e., also people of Western origin. This inflationary effect is exploited by populist political entrepreneurs hoping to stir concern about alienation in times of Europeanization. The threat of "the others" in the Netherlands is thus easily construed to be much larger than it would be possible if statistics were enumerated differently.*

Keywords: *Dutch citizenship and naturalization; allochtoon vs. autochtoon; Muslim migration; right-wing extremism*

Introduction

Like many nation states, the Netherlands was not always home to a homogenous people. In modern times, the Dutch nation could only exist and survive by considerable tolerance towards religious pluralism, culminating during the twentieth century in what got to be known as a consociational democracy (Lijphart 1968). The term refers to a nation which contains parallel societies, segregated to varying extents, and with little social interaction. All denominations (religious but also political ones like the liberals and the social democrats) were self-contained – each with its own political representatives and infrastructure like schools, universities, unions, hospitals, media, and so on. Equal access to the state's scarce but relatively stable resources guaranteed peaceful co-existence and continuity. This era came to its end with the assent of individualism in the 1970s. With few exceptions the Dutch no longer consider it relevant whether their neighbors and colleagues are Red, Roman Catholic or Protestant whereas earlier the social distances between these denominations had been virtually insurmountable and so "the others" most Dutch people were most keenly aware of in those days of limited international travel were actually part of "us" as a nation at the same time. The situation has changed dramatically.

The nation saw large numbers of international migrants arriving more or less continuously from the end of the Second World War (not suggesting there had been no significant international migration during earlier periods). This did not in all cases mean that "others" emerged, especially not if these migrants had been part of Dutch colonial elites. In other instances immigrants did bring new cultures and denominations into the country. Their socio-economic integration was less self-evident but initially this did not give rise to significant political concerns and the government's policy focus was inclusive. The past decade changed this. A growing electoral support goes to those politicians who point out imported deviation from the Dutch main stream. Islam is the most frequently invoked. This goes hand in hand with exclusionary rhetoric and policies; in van Houtum and van Naerssen (2002) terms (b)ordering and "othering" and a reshaping of what Geddes (2005) calls conceptual borders. This happens both willfully by political entrepreneurs and as a paradoxical outcome of categorization for the benefit of inclusionary government policies.

At the same time Dutch territorial borders have lost most of their significance as a consequence of European integration. Only the sea ports and

Schiphol airport are still actively guarded borders because they are gates of entry for arrivals from outside the Schengen area (the European Union's member states minus the United Kingdom, Ireland, Bulgaria, and Romania and plus Switzerland with Norway). Although mobility within this area has practically no bounds and immigration in the Netherlands has by and large become European more and more efforts are put into keeping out unwanted migrants from outside of Europe (third country nationals). The borders surrounding the Schengen area obviously have some relevance in this respect. Although legally speaking these are also Dutch, they have little political connection to Dutch sovereignty which at present is primarily exercised through admission, residence and naturalization policies. In other words, governing admission to the system has replaced admission to the territory as such (cf. Geddes 2005). Prospective immigrants who are to be excluded from admission are increasingly the same as those Dutch long-term residents and citizens who are, in turn, the subjects of conceptual borders even though for legal reasons they cannot be all singled out (i.e., the principle of non-discrimination). Dutch measures thus affect wider categories of aliens.

This article sets out to describe and analyze the processes by which this reordering and re-shifting of membership in the Dutch nation occurs; who might be eligible to belong; and who *de jure* belongs but socially speaking is on the outside regardless. The reasoning is much in line with that of Geddes (2005) who identifies close connections between European economic and political integration while access to welfare systems and labor markets to an important extent remain national, and the salience of external borders. He also argues that this in a sense means that borders within the nation – those of an organizational and conceptual nature – stay important or even gain in significance.

Central in his argument stands the distinction between those who are excluded and those who are included by immigration policies. After showing how this works out in the Dutch case, we take Geddes' reasoning a few steps further by discussing the effects of specific institutional arrangements that allow for such drawing of borders *within* the nation's population; i.e., not between nationals and non-nationals. The Dutch case has its specific characteristics but is assumed to be illustrative for virtually universal mechanisms. Indeed, it is furthermore suggested that processes of integration of diverse populations (like the European area of Freedom, Security and Justice) almost by definition demand an increased "othering" of those who are not partners in such a project.

Following Anderson's reasoning, historically economic and political integration went hand in hand with a process of nation building (2006). Whether this is also going to hold true in the European case is hard to predict. And as long as Europeans cannot be sure about who they are as "a nation" at least it is helpful to know who they are not. Here too the scope and implications of the article aim beyond the Dutch case. As a backdrop against which we can discuss these developments, a brief overview of immigration to the Netherlands of the past decades needs to be introduced.

Post-war immigration

In spite of their overall victory, the end of World War II left most European colonial powers weakened. The Dutch case was no exception. Japanese occupation had set in motion a desire among Indonesians to become independent. Initial attempts to counter such development led to an uprising and the deployment of Dutch troops. Still by 1949 Indonesian independence had become unavoidable. Not all of the new nation's inhabitants were equally happy with this outcome and sought to move to the Dutch "motherland." Often these people had been members of the Indonesian middle classes, belonging to or being associated with the Dutch ruling elite. Their arrival was seen as an anomaly, an unexpected inflow of people with a tropical background, but also as a logical consequence of the end of an era. In official discourse these immigrants were referred to as "repatriates" suggesting they all had been born in the Netherlands (Lucassen and Penninx 1997). After Indonesian independence (and that of New Guinea) only Suriname and some Caribbean Islands were left as remnants of the colonial past. From 1954 these had been full parts of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and until today this holds true for the islands of Aruba, Bonaire, Curacao, Sint Maarten, Saba, and Sint Eustacius. Suriname gained its independence in 1975, in the process of which a large section of the Surinamese population moved to the Netherlands. Their numbers further grew during the five years following independence because during that period Surinamese citizens could still opt for Dutch citizenship provided they had moved to the "motherland" before late 1980. By then about a third of all Surinamese people had resettled in the Netherlands, predominantly in the larger cities (van Amersfoort 2011).

Once the Dutch economy had recovered from the Second World War demands on the labor market became such that local employers began looking

abroad for temporary workers. Between 1960 and 1970 this demand became the subject of the bilateral agreements with a number of Mediterranean countries. Among those were Turkey and Morocco, the largest sources of foreign workers and many subsequent migrants after labor recruitment came to its end as a result of the first oil crisis in 1973 (Penninx et al. 1994: 10). Implicitly it was expected that these Mediterranean "guest workers" would return home once they were no longer needed. This did not happen to any major extent and immigration continued, this time of family members of these labor migrants. By the end of the 1970s it became clear to the government that many migrants had settled and therefore their integration should be facilitated. On the one hand this meant that they should have easy access to Dutch citizenship so they could exercise all necessary rights. It also meant that, following the Dutch "pillarization" tradition, they should be encouraged to retain their own culture.

Until the mid 1980s Dutch immigration first and foremost had its origin in these (post) colonial and "guest worker" experiences. Together with the second generation this immigration resulted in sizeable ethnic communities. From the second half of the 1980s continuing immigration from these sources came to be superseded by a rapidly diversifying immigration of refugees and asylum seekers. They arrived from many parts of the economically less developed world and also from the disintegrating and civil war-torn Yugoslav Republic. This immigration dominated during the 1990s, only to lose its significance after the introduction of a strict new immigration law in 2001.

Today, 1.7 million people who live in the Netherlands are immigrants (foreign born) (constituting 10.7% of the population). Adding their off-spring 21% of the Dutch population has foreign roots, or in the terms normally used in Dutch public discourse, this is the size of the *allochtonous* population (something we return to later on) (figures from CBS Statline, 2014). In 2012, 378,000 residents had their roots in Indonesia; 347,000 in Suriname, 393,000 in Turkey, and 363,000 in Morocco. The immigration of people seeking refuge in the 1990s added numerous ethnic communities to the Dutch social landscape.

Presently, immigration from Turkey, Morocco and former colonies has lost its numerical significance. Furthermore, immigration from countries for which restrictions can apply, i.e., non-EU nationals, decreased considerably after 2004, the year in which the Union welcomed ten new members. Since their citizens by now have all gained the freedom to settle in the Netherlands a sizeable share of all

immigration into the Netherlands is no longer subject to any government intervention. In recent years about forty percent of all immigrants were not EU-nationals and less than a third came from non-Western countries. During the past decade net-migration oscillated around zero and in 2013 stood at plus 12,000, largely made up by Polish arrivals (Jennissen 2014). The relevance of Dutch national – restrictive – migration policies thus seems to gradually disappear.

Sorting out natives and newcomers

One of the clearest windows through which to see into the heart of a nation is framed by its statistics, notably those enumerating the population. Countries in which membership traditionally has been characterized by *jus sanguinis* (the law of the blood) assuming ethnic homogeneity and the importance of descent tend to give special importance to the statistical distinction between nationals and foreigners (Fassmann 2009). By definition, citizenship based on ethnicity makes it difficult to incorporate newcomers with clearly different ethnic features. Naturalization thus tends to be difficult and conditional upon the desire to assimilate and blend in. Under those circumstances "immigrants" are the same as "foreigners" for prolonged periods of time and can thus be found in the population statistics. In some countries it is not unusual for the children of immigrants to still be categorized as foreigners because they inherit the nationality of their parents. At the same time immigrants can escape enumeration if they are nationals. The millions of *Aussiedler* (ethnic Germans who are descendants of migrants who left Germany for one of the Eastern European destinations two centuries ago) resettling in Germany are a well-known case in point (op. cit.). In contrast, nations that have nationality law based on the notion of *jus soli* (the law of the land) define membership according to place of birth. This obviously has a much more inclusive effect than *jus sanguinis*. Indeed, countries that are typical representatives of this principle do collect statistics based on immigration (foreign-born persons) and nationality but as a consequence descendants of migrants are not traceable in the population statistics. They thus form an unknown size population.

When the Dutch government in the early 1980s developed its migrant integration policies, as mentioned, these included easy naturalization. At the same time the government expressed an interest in the ability to monitor the long-term effects of its integration efforts – i.e., into the second generation. This necessitated the introduction of descent as a statistical marker. This was

done by the use of the concept of *allochtoon*. The term gained currency once it was adopted by the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) in its milestone report of 1989 titled *Allochtonenbeleid* (Allochtone Policy) (Jacobs and Rea 2012). The *allochtonous* are currently defined as those residents who are either born abroad and have at least one parent who is foreign born or, if born in the Netherlands, they have at least one foreign born parent (Ibid.). By default, those to whom this does not apply are the *autochtonous*. Because not all immigrant groups are deemed to be in need of government support a further distinction was made between Western and non-Western *allochtonous* people. Westerners are Europeans and others from industrialized countries (for historical reasons including Indonesia). Non-Western *allochtonen* are those who hail from the economically less developed parts of the world.

On the one hand this concept makes ethnicity traceable in population statistics but on the other hand it does so in an imprecise way leading to distortion. For instance, migrants and their children who arrived from Kurdistan or who fled Turkey because they belonged to the Armenian or Assyrian minorities are all labeled as "Turkish." "Moroccan" likewise includes people with roots in the Rif Mountains and those stemming from the Arab-speaking part of the nation. "Surinamese" is a label under which a heterogeneous people with African, American, Dutch and Asian roots can be found. Needless to say ethnic groups as identified for Dutch policy purposes are also in other ways highly diverse in character and hence also have members with widely differing needs for government assistance. Compared to population counts that are based only on place of birth, the notion of *allochtoon* unavoidably inflates the category of persons in (potential) need of government concern. As mentioned, 11% of the Dutch population are immigrants. Out of those, 705,000 are of Western origin. The remaining one million migrants were born in a non-Western country. It is crucial to note that when we speak about these migrants and their children in terms of *allochtoon* the category all of a sudden doubles in size. Given the fact that one foreign born parent already fulfils the requirements of the definition it includes the children of exogamous marriages, a phenomenon usually indicating substantial social integration.

In political discourse the distinctions between Western and non-Western; migrants and Dutch-born; nationals and foreigners; settlers and temporary migrants; EU nationals and third country nationals; and other possible significant distinctions are more often than not surrendered to the catch-all term *allochtoon*. Obviously, it is not then easy to distinguish what precisely

is meant when using the word in public discourse. Yet, to this author and others (e.g., Geschiere 2009) it is abundantly clear that the term has gradually moved from being a neutral instrument of benign inclusion to one denoting a lack of integration and even to one suitable for pejorative usage. Or as Jacobs and Rea (2012: 46) note "It was gradually bestowed with a connotation of the "non-white non-European Other". In effect, while they constitute the majority within this category, it also gradually has become a label for the Turkish and Moroccan immigrants and their children who, by and large, constitute the Dutch Muslim community (see also Geschiere 2009: 151). This is especially true for its use in the media but also in political discussion (Jacobs and Rea 2012: 45).

Populism, Islam and the *allochtoon*

Added to the above observations on the diffuse and inflationary nature of the concept *allochtoon* should be a note on the ascent of populist parties in the Netherlands. In the months before the general elections of May 2002 a new political party was founded by Pim Fortuyn; a party he named after himself (Lijst Pim Fortuyn or LPF). One of the issues he was very vocal about and which resonated strongly with a considerable part of the electorate was Islam, immigration and integration. Islam he called a backward culture. Furthermore, he promoted a total ban on further immigration (together with a general amnesty for irregular residents, especially failed asylum seekers). Nine days before the elections he was assassinated. His party nevertheless landed a landslide electoral victory. The government that was formed included a number of LPF ministers but after ninety days it disintegrated, making new elections necessary. While in the new elections the LFP party dwindled, it became clear to many mainstream politicians that substantial political gains could be achieved by following the sentiments voiced by Fortuyn. Notably Geert Wilders, a member of parliament since 1997 for the Liberal Party (VVD, Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie), adopted a number of Fortuyn's opinions. Together with his explicit refusal to consider Turkish membership in the European Union these put him at odds with the VVD's political line and subsequently, in 2004, he left the party while retaining his seat in parliament. In the 2006 general elections he participated with his own party, de Partij voor de Vrijheid PVV (Freedom Party). Out of the

150 parliamentary seats, his party got nine. Since then Wilders can be quoted making statements like: "Islam is not a religion but an evil ideology; Mein Kampf is outlawed – if that's justified so should be the Quran which likewise is a fascist book"; "because they amount to pollution there should be a tax on headscarves"; "all criminal Muslims should be expelled." Wilders and his party, furthermore, call vandalism and crime by young Moroccans "street terrorism," mosques are "hate palaces," and Islam is a "desert ideology." During a March 2010 press conference in which he underlines his refusal to accept Turkish membership in the EU "because it would mean more immigration from the Islamic culture" in passing he referred to the Turkish prime minister as a "total freak." At the same event, he informed the journalists that he preferred to have no further mosques and would applaud the abolition of Islamic schools.

The PVV stands not alone in this but tends to phrase its views more bluntly than most others who participate in the debates about the place of Islam in Western society. Frequently voiced in public debate for instance is an assumed intolerance among Muslims towards homosexuals and inequality between men and women; and their religion being in need of a reformation (similarly to Christianity that needed to become modern) (Mepschen et al. 2010). Dutch morality is more and more conceived in secular terms (Kennedy and Zwemer 2010: 266) adding to the moral superiority invoked by those who see religion in general and Islam in particular as backward. The rhetoric of the PVV intimately links Islam as an assumed threat to modern society with the *allochtoon* being a person who is prone to crime and is a subscriber to different – non-Dutch – norms and values.

Whenever doubt arises about the continued value of the *allochtoon* and *autochtoon* dualism, the PVV is among the first to campaign for its further use. In February 2008 its parliamentarians Fritsma and Wilders asked the following questions to the Minister of Justice (who proposed to abandon the term "allochtoon"):

1) *Is it correct you want to ban the words "allochtoon" and "autochtoon" from our language? If so:*

2) *Do you expect the misery caused by many allochtonen to Dutch society to go away if we simply stop using these words?*

3) *Why do you not want to make the distinction between autochtoon – allochtoon even though the distinction is highly relevant when it comes to crime, street terror, welfare dependency and such?*

4) Could the Cabinet stop its politically correct driveling and move to deal with the many problems that are largely connected to immigration/integration? If not, why not? [1]

The June 2010 general elections showed that support for the PVV had grown considerably; with 23 seats it had become the third largest in parliament. Wilders' party remained outside the new government but as this was a coalition built upon a parliamentarian minority, tolerated and supported by the PVV it could exercise considerable influence on the drafting of the coalition agreement. This pressure explains, at least to a large extent, why the government pursued such goals as:

- renegotiating EU law pertaining to family migration (in order to raise the legal age for bringing in a spouse and to introduce integration requirements as a condition for a residence permit);
- a ban on burka wearing;
- discouragement of multiple nationalities;
- naturalization becoming the crown upon successful integration;
- revoking nationality acquired through naturalization in case of serious criminal conduct;
- making naturalization conditional for integration (e.g., professional experience, income level or educational attainments);
- turning illegal residence into a crime or offence;
- barring anyone who at any point irregularly resided in the country from ever receiving a residence permit; and
- cutting immigration from non-Western countries by half.

The latter point is particularly interesting because this goal is motivated by the PVV's urge to curtail mass immigration in general and that of Muslims in particular. At the same, as we saw, current immigration that might be subjected to restriction stands at a low level and it seems questionable whether it can be appropriately called "mass immigration." In other words, the construction of an "enemy" or the "problematic others" does not necessarily bear any connection to reality. At the same time it seems typical for the discourse employed

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1   Published on the PVV's website. http://pvv.nl/index.php/home-mainmenu-1/11-kamervragen/889-voorstel-om-term-qallochtoonq-te-schrappen-kamervragen.html, posted 25 February 2008, accessed October 20, 2011. Author's translation.

by the PVV to use language that the intended recipient will likely associate with public judgments instead of trying to be as precise as possible in defining political issues. However, it is obviously difficult to criticize Wilders' for using this argument as his party representatives may just deny such intentions in their language use as false accusation. It should be noted that in fact the PVV usually refuses to respond to any criticism and Wilders routinely ignores calls for public debate. As suggested earlier, the term *allochtoon* tends to be used in an inaccurate and generalizing manner. In addition, the PVV proposes to expand the definition of the *allochtoon* category by including the migrants' grandchildren. A PVV parliamentarian on the need for such a widened definition: "Non-Western *allochtonen* are still overrepresented in the crime figures. Next we won't see that any more because they'll be registered as autochtoon. (…) Measuring is knowing." (Volkskrant 29 June 2011). Two of the PVV parliamentarians formulated the following question to the Secretary for Health, Welfare, and Sports in response to media reports that nurses do not report violent abuse:

Is it correct that cultural differences are often the cause of violent incidents? What will you do to protect nurses against allochtonen who could not care less about our norms and values?[2]

Wilders himself usually limits his critical reflections to non-western *allochtonen* – especially the Muslims. On the basis of the present definition Statistics Netherlands already predicts that by 2050 the Netherlands is going to be home to five million *allochtonen* (thirty percent of the total population) (Garssen and van Duin 2009). Adding the third generation this percentage is bound to go up tremendously. If at the same time the meaning of the term *allochtoon* is blurred even more and remains associated with maladjustment, crime and "street terror" this would seem a path towards social disintegration on an unprecedented scale – at least for the Netherlands.

In the Spring of 2012, the PVV terminated its support of the coalition government because it did not want to be responsible for sizeable cuts in the national budget. In November a new government was installed, this time one bringing together Liberals and Social Democrats. Their stated ambition is to run a pragmatic course. Discussions on Islam and *allochtoon* people have joined the economic concerns stemming from the Euro crisis and the high price the Dutch nation is likely to pay for the survival of the Eurozone. This challenge

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2   Kamervraag 2011Z18965 (vergaderjaar 2011–2012).

overshadows others. Meanwhile most of the policy changes set in motion under the PVV's pressure – criminalization of foreigners without a residence permit and further limitations on family migration – remain unaltered by the new government.

The European Dimension

Until the 1990s the Netherlands was still very much rooted in its tradition of accommodating ethnic or denominational differences. Government interventions were characterized by a strong desire towards inclusion and the downplaying of the conflict potential of such differences. Even though from the mid 1970s onwards the government pursued a restrictive immigration policy there were also considerable efforts made to keep up humanitarian principles in line with international legal obligations. In effect, only few obstacles were put in the way of family migration and the influx of new refugees. This relatively welcoming position gradually changed. Throughout the 2000s, Europe became an area of justice, freedom, and security (to recall a mantra coined by the European Commission) with no internal limits to mobility. While this process developed, it also seemed to necessitate a joint European position towards the rest of the world – a position that had to be based upon shared interests.

Considering what was achieved in terms of common policies on migration and asylum in May 2004 and what is in existence at present, the conclusion is that the EU synchronization has focused on restrictions, border enforcement, and off-shoring of refugee protection. Joint positions on how to make the EU space attractive to immigrants or how to offer optimal protection to refugees remain rare (for instance the widely discussed Blue Card never really got off the ground). The only truly progressive policies are those towards third country long-term residents who have been granted uniform rights throughout the Union and uniformed rights to family migration. Most other efforts serve to cordon off the joint EU territory and define those outside as suspects of possible border transgression. These observations are generally true for all EU states with the caveat that some are (or until recently were) more open towards third-country nationals than others (Doomernik and Jandl 2008a).

The Netherlands is currently among those member states who seek to curtail immigration the most. The mood to do so has found its reflection not only on the outside borders of the EU, where the borders are increasingly "performed" rather than pragmatically managed (Green 2010), but also added

to the salience of internal borders. Some of those are a direct reflection of the hurdles imposed on prospective migrants from third countries and aim at internal migration controls at the gates of the welfare state. This aim is much in line with Geddes' (2005) observation that drawing of borders in this respect serves to differentiate between "useful migrants" and those who are unlikely to be so. Specific to the Dutch case is that this "bordering" is not limited to territorial and organizational boundaries but has also found a translation deep in the folds of Dutch society's fabric by institutionalized means of categorization and conceptualization via *de allochtoon*. The term seems to have become the tool for comprehensive "othering."

Conclusion

Allochtoon was originally devised to target policy efforts and the scientific/ statistical evaluation of policy outcomes. Over the years, as integration policy elevated the significance of *being born abroad*, and especially of having a foreign born parent, in many instances it loses its original salience. Furthermore, expanding the label by including children born out of exogenous relationships (e.g., a Dutch mother and a father of non-Western origin) it is assumed that the "foreign" parent's ethnic or other traits are of greater consequence for the child's identity and societal position than those of the Dutch parent. Obviously, this is a problematic assumption. Furthermore this practice leads to an inflation of the perceived number of people in a disadvantaged position. In sum, while in policy terms and for scientific evaluation the relevance of the distinction between *autochtoon* and *allochtoon* decreases, the size of the population considered *allochtoon* increases.

The fact that the size of the *allochtonous* part of the Dutch population increases is convenient for populist political rhetoric for it offers the possibility to identify "a growing problem." It thus comes with no surprise that the Freedom Party proposes to include the third generation of immigrants in the category. The populist parties' framing has furthermore associated these growing numbers with a very specific threat – that of the alleged Islamic fifth column within the Dutch society. Geddes (2005) points to the connections between several types of borders – those that define the nation state and its institutions and those that encircle the joint European Union territory. On the basis of the Dutch experience we might ask whether there is yet another connection. Might not the loss of visible territorial borders and

visible sovereignty, and hence the connection between the political and the practical be fertile ground for the populists who stress the need to defend the nation against the threats from elsewhere. And, in addition, since the state policies largely failed to do, is there not an urge to defend the *true* Dutch people from within as well?

Van Houtum and van Naerssen (2002) show by what means "othering," ordering, and bordering are shaped and they convincingly argue that these are dynamic processes. As far as bordering serves administrative and fiscal purposes their presence and function do not pose great riddles. This is not so easily explained when we ask why the "othering" within societies has recently gained so much momentum and has followed very particular lines. Nor is it self-evident that the outside borders of Europe should be maintained in such a visible and militant manner as is currently the case. This paper illustrated that institutional arrangements (such as the perpetuation, modification, and potential expansion of the *allochtoon* category) play an important role in the process of domestic "othering." Furthermore, it suggests that if nations that up until now presented separate countries and state policies are now all part of the constructed European "us," constructing the "others" entails having characteristics that make one non-European: the characteristics of third-country immigrants and – in varying ways – their descendants.

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