

Introduction to Husserl's phenomenology of emotions in the context of his philosophical development

Autor: David Rybák

Abstract

Introduction to Husserl's phenomenology of emotions in the context of his philosophical development. – In this text, we follow the issue of feelings and emotions in the context of the development of Edmund Husserl's phenomenology, from *Logical Investigations* to the late project of the phenomenology of instincts.

Keywords: feelings, emotions, life, ego, philosophy, phenomenology, history

Klíčová slova: city, emoce, život, ego, filosofie, fenomenologie, historie

Introduction

If we follow Husserl's philosophical development, we can see that together with the issues of his phenomenology there is a constant self-reflection (*Selbstbesinnung*) concerning Husserl's own experience with philosophizing. From this point of view we can understand that after *Logical Investigations* the issues of the past experience begin to arise. These issues, on the side of the philosopher, are related to the paradox of continuity with his past philosophical life. And gradually, the issues of historicity are revealed together with the peculiar passivity belonging to the transcendence and continuity of meaning. *The life of phenomenology and the one who is practicing phenomenology is going through a constant self-transformation of his affections and actions.*

Phenomenology no longer operates within the frame of the oppositions of spontaneity and receptivity, attribution and modality, abstract and particular. In these oppositions is present the presumption of causation that is subjected to questioning. Husserl's phenomenology represents one way of such a questioning.

The goal of the present study is to present the origins and development of Husserl's phenomenology of emotions from its beginning in *Logical Investigations* to the subsequent projects.¹ I attempt to provide an introduction to the problematic of feelings and emotions in frame just described. Indeed, it is more of a rough retelling in a limited space. But it is my hope that the chosen procedure will serve the reader for a basic introduction and for making the overall idea of Husserl's thinking development as well.

¹ As we choose in our genetic approach *Logical Investigations* as a starting point, it is worth pointing out that the phenomena of feelings and emotions are examined and described by Husserl also in his psychological, of as he himself calls it, "pre-phenomenological" approach. Cf. the appendix Nr. 2 in Hua 38. (I quote according to the Husserliana edition. The reader will find the full citations in the bibliography.)

The specificity of the phenomenological approach

Phenomenological attitude is unnatural (*unnatürlich*) and also the one who practices phenomenology *is an unnatural creature*. Phenomenologist, unlike laymen and scientists, is not situated in the natural world, rather in a non-place² from which the pure description of any ‘being-in-the-world’ becomes possible. The sciences concerning man are defined by the methodological framework with the relevant ontological region belonging to it. Each of these methodological frameworks isolates from man a certain aspect of his being (biological, psychological, social etc.). But no one is able to approach man as man, *in his whole and essence*. For instance, the biological sciences observe man as a species of animal or more generally, as organism in which certain processes take place, has a certain organization etc.

And again, psychology takes into account man’s inner experience or behavior, sociology his social side, political science observes the human community in terms of production and reproduction of power relations etc. Each of these sciences presupposes man as being in the objective world: man is treated as an object of research. And even his subjective side is studied in the objectifying sense of ‘being-in-the-objective-world’. All over his texts, Husserl’s continuously emphasizes that *man is not only an object in the world, but also a subject for the world*. And it is precisely this freedom occurring as ‘being object and subject for the world as well’³ that phenomenology wants to study. This freedom is necessarily overlooked by all human sciences, or more precisely, these sciences are embedding it into the objective world.

The point of the phenomenological approach is to make us free from the assumptions that come into the way we understand ourselves. That occurs by making these assumptions visible and discarding them. These assumptions include interpreting ourselves from the objective states of our objective being in the world. We are talking about so-called *objectifying apperceptions or acts (objektivierende Akte)*, which situate us in the objective world. Let us recall the essential feature of intentional consciousness, that every consciousness is the ‘consciousness of something as something’. To apprehend or interpret ‘something as something’ is by Husserl called apperception (*Apperzeption*).

In his considerations, Husserl proceeds from the parallelism between meanings and experiences as acts of signifying (*Akte des Bedeutens*): to meanings in specie correspond acts of signifying.⁴ To any ‘I am aware’ belongs essentially the structure signifying-signified, or meaning-meant, intending-intended. For the illustration we can use Husserl’s example of a wax figure. We can be wrong and apprehend the wax figure as a human, i.e. to apprehend the relevant sensory data *as* a human. Eventually we can find then our mistake, so our apperception (the ‘as’) changes.

We could imagine the objectifying apperceptions as a kind of bridge between our consciousness and objective things in the world. Such a representation is somewhat dangerous in that it suggests that there is something called consciousness on the one side, and objective world on the other. As we already know, consciousness is the consciousness of something as something. Consciousness is the sole transcendence of this ‘something as something’. With

² Cf. Plato’s term *u-topia*.

³ The spontaneity of self-positing is then only one of derived moments of this freedom.

⁴ Hua 19, p. A322/B343.

this idea in mind, we can say that consciousness means always already 'being in the world'. But again, there is a difference between our mental experience (*Erleben*) and the things experienced. For instance, there is a difference between objective time as measured by hours and time experienced (*erlebt*). And again, there is a difference between objective space and things in it, as they appear to us who are situated in our 'Here' by our lived bodies. A spatial connection, articulated by our interest is centered and extended around our body.

As we have already pointed out, also psychology operates in objectified realm. Indeed, some schools of psychology study the subjective experience and develop hypotheses regarding mental life. But in the set of assumptions within which psychology operates belongs approach to man as something in the objective world. The knowledge of psychology has a sense of *real* immanence, or to put it in other words, mental experience has an ontological status of objectified subjectivity within the apperception of the objective world. But the mental experiences (*Erlebnisse*) are not contents of consciousness, as Cartesian metaphysics and subsequent psychology would presuppose.

What is conscious as a mental experience is not something accidentally added to consciousness, but it belongs to the *essence of consciousness* that it is a consciousness of something. *Consciousness is the sole transcendence to what is conscious in it*. Husserl's phenomenology wants to gain access to the pure experience before all our apperception of the world. Even this apperception as such is sense-giving operation. In order to understand ourselves, it is necessary to discard all objective apperceptions, including the apperception of the world and to reduce to pure inner experience.

One could argue that our experience is contingent and particular. That is true, but phenomenology does not concern mental experiences as experiences of an individual man in the objective world.

Husserl examines *mental experiences in which the intersubjectively valid world is constituted*. For example, to be able to perceive this spatial thing as a table, I must be able to go beyond what is currently given to me, namely, the profile from such and such perspective, and apprehend it 'as table'. However, this is only possible only due to the fact that I already have an apperceptive type 'table' in my experiential history – I understand what kinaestheses are correlative to the respective thing-type. In such an apperception the sphere of what is adequately given to me is transcended to what is not given, but belongs to a thing of the respective type.

The point of the inhibition of objectifying apperceptions is to enclose the realm of immanent pure experiential multiplicities from which the apperceptive systems are constituted. It is in this immanence that the pure possibilities are constituted. And only on this phenomenological ground of inner consciousness can we obtain adequate givenness, i.e. such a givenness in which what is meant is correlative to what is given. To put it other way round, when this immanence is exceeded, adequacy is lost, the adequately given is mixed with what is not given in evidence. If research is located at the level of the world-apperception, the world and worldly entities are naively taken for granted, together with their inadequacy. In the reduction to adequate givenness, therefore, the meaning 'the-world-intended-as-real' remains, but we no longer exercise and live *in* this intending. In phenomenological investigation we no

longer locate ourselves in the world. The world is no longer a natural starting point of our research.

Phenomenology of feelings and emotions in *Logical Investigations*

Husserl's phenomenology is often criticized for the primacy of objectifying acts.⁵ By focusing on phenomenological study of the apperceptive constitution of our experience, and especially on the higher, logical (and mathematical) formations, the primary role of objectifying acts was determined. In these acts the relation to something *as an object* is constituted. Their correlate is the represented object *as represented*. Feelings and will thus acquired the status of independent moments, which are founded on these objectifying acts. But feelings and willing are not just passive states. As acts, that is, as 'consciousness of something' they contain an intentional relationship and also a certain attitude in itself.

Husserl distinguishes between: 1) feelings (*Gefühle*) and 2) emotions (*Gemüt*). There is a certain ambiguity in the concept of emotion, because, on the one hand, emotion has the aspect of passivity (*pathe, passio, affectus*: something happens to us, we are subjected to something), and on the other hand, there is an aspect of activity in this concept (*emotio*: we like something, we desire something and we are moved by it):

ad 1) Husserl further distinguished between feeling sensations (*Gefühlsempfindungen*) or sensory feelings (*sinnliche Gefühle*) and feeling acts (*Gefühlsakte*). Sensory feelings are founded on sensory contents (*Empfindungsinhalten*), respectively, they are mixed with them (*verschmolzen*).⁶ Unlike sensory feelings, emotional acts are focused objectively, they have its object.⁷ For instance, according to Husserl, in the phenomena of joy, we have a representation and connected to this representation is the sensation of pleasure (*Lustempfindung*). And this sensation of pleasure has its subjective side in awaking the sensation of joy and its objective side in the objective feature localized on the represented object (or situation, event). At the same time, this sensing of pleasure is apprehended by the experiencing subject as causing pleasure, and correlatively as an objective property of a joyful event, so that the object is somehow immersed in a pink glow.⁸ Conversely, in mourning, events and objects are shrouded in mourning-coloring (*Färbung*).

Are feelings objectifying, that is, do they constitute an object as represented, or not? Husserl criticizes Brentano's conception according to which representations are founding for acts of judgments and evaluations. According to Husserl, it is not the case that we first have a representation of the object and only then associatively connected act of liking or disliking. Feeling is focused on the object and without such a focus it would not be possible.⁹ For delight or joy, the relation to the delightful or joyful object, situation etc. In this sense, delight

⁵ Lévinas in particular speaks of the objectifying obsession of Husserl's phenomenology. And if I understand Heidegger's contentions well, Husserl's phenomenology deploys in secondary, derived level, thus overlooking the more original truth of Being. Husserl thus replaces the Being with the being of transcendental subjectivity. This line of criticism is also followed by Jan Patočka. For me, the question remains whether these critical positions are able to cope with the fact that they themselves are embedded in the continuity of theoretical questioning. And it is this path of constant self-problematization.

⁶ Hua 19, p. B 391-2.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. B 394-5.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. B 394.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. A 368.

or joy is intentional. But there are also non-intentional feelings. For instance pain is a non-intentional feeling.¹⁰ That some feelings are non-intentional does not mean for Husserl that they are mere states (*Zustände*) of the subject according to the model of physical causation.¹¹

2) Feeling enter into egoic acts (*Gefühlsakten*) of liking, evaluation etc. Compared to feelings, emotions (*Gemüt*) are constituted at the higher level of constitution. They are built on representation and judgments and belong to acts of will, they are acts of our spiritual freedom, not just an affective passivity.¹² As Husserl puts it later: “Die Individualität zeigt sich in dem, was sie liebt und hasst, nicht in dem sinnlichen Lust- oder Schmerzgefühl”.¹³

Texts from time of Göttingen lectures about ethics and axiology (1908–1914)

An important shift for our topic lies in the development of the motive of perception of value or value perception (*Wertnehmung*). The objective, true properties of objects are given to us in the perception of truth (*Wahrnehmung*).¹⁴ Perception has a specific intentionality: act of meaning or signifying is fulfilled with an intuitive givenness. In other words, to the essence of perception belongs the self-givenness in the sense: ‘now the perceived is given to me as thing itself, in person’. Similarly valuable things as valuable are given to us in the value perception of sensory contents of pleasure, or displeasure or pain that are also given in self-givenness. In contrast to *Logical Investigations*, value perception has its own matter (‘good’, ‘pleasing’, ‘sweet’, ‘tasty’ etc.).¹⁵

As we already know, perception is different from judgment. Judgment is founded on perceptive acts. Thus, in the perception of value (expressed by the predicates ‘nice’, ‘good’ etc.) it is not the case that we first perceive an object and only then judge whether we like it or not, whether it is good or not. But even this second type of constitution is possible: we can see an object and then discover by subsequent judging that it is valuable to us. The total apperception of an object then changes. The constitution of money with its exchange value that is not perceived directly on papers or metal coins could be an example for such a constitution. In perception, objects are constituted for us, in value perception, *objects* are constituted *as valuable*. We apperceive *values themselves* (‘Good’, ‘Beauty’, ‘Usefulness’) only in acts founded on value perception. Thus, we have 1) sensation mixed with feelings, 2) the apprehension of this mix, 3) emotional evaluation or taking a stance, which again can enter into the apprehension of respective object or object-type.¹⁶

Husserl investigates the relation between desire and its fulfilling in analogy to the correlation between meaning and its fulfilling. An empty desire for the desired does not yet

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. B 391-2.

¹¹ Cf. *ibid.*, p. A 367.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. B 367-8. We need to add that in contrast to feelings, emotions (*Gemüt*) are not subject to an explicit investigation in *Logical Investigations*.

¹³ Hua 14, p. 20.

¹⁴ Cf. HUSSERL, Edmund. *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und Phänomenologischen Philosophie*. 2. Buch, *Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution*. Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1952, p. 9. (I cite as *Ideen II*.)

¹⁵ Cf. MELLE, Ulrich. Husserls deskriptive Erforschung der Gefühlserlebnisse. In BREEUR, Roland, MELLE, Ulrich (ed.). *Life, Subjectivity & Art. Essays in Honor of Rudolf Bernet*. Dordrecht, Heidelberg, London, New York: Springer, 2012, p. 85.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 96.

have its correlate in the object as *real*, but only in the object as ‘meant-as-desirable’. This meaning does not need to be fulfilled. Elementary example: when I eat a cake which I desire, this desiring can be disappointed by the fact that this *real* cake is not tasty at all. Or it can be the case that the meaning is fulfilled and the cake is then experienced with the noetic feature ‘hold as tasty’.

There is a correlative relation between perception and perceived object, between valuing and valued object. Correlation is constitutive for intentionality. In empiricism, an object is dissolved into sensory perceptions and representations and as a consequence the mystery arises how we know something at all about things themselves. Similarly in hedonism, delight and subsequent evaluation and an object are mixed together.¹⁷ These moments must be distinguished. Another distinction is important, namely between 1) value perception (*Wertnehmen*) as an act of the feeling subject, 2) value as fulfilled in this value perception and 3) the valuable object.¹⁸

While the mental experience of valuing has its own timing in the immanence of the inner time-consciousness, for value itself it is not necessary. Indeed, real valuable objects in time and space can arise and disappear (Husserl gives an example of a concert), but ideal values do not cease to exist (a concert ends eventually, but for the musical piece, it is not the case).¹⁹

How to understand the shift expressed by the concept of value perception? Although feelings provide the starting point for apperceptions, they themselves are constituted in the stream of consciousness. In this stream, sensation and its perception are first constituted as a unity in the immanent time. In other words, the sensations already contain, though not fully, the intentionality which is located below the I’s activity for which it is constitutive.²⁰ And this means that act of evaluation does not deploy at the level of apperception of sensory data, but already at the level of sensations themselves. It is precisely this shift that opened up new paths for Husserl. Let us point out that in the shift just described also the introduction of the pure I in the *Ideas* is being prepared. The living ‘I’ turns to (*sich zuwendet*) or away from the sensory contents.

Ideas to pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy

Although even in the *Ideas* the perspective of objectifying representations and the judgments and valuations remains, there is another change in the phenomenological approach alone, important for our topic. The investigations are now widened with regard to the *life of the pure I*. New investigations no longer take place at the psychological-empirical level (as in *Logical Investigations*), but at the level of the transcendental constitution of the world-horizon and its articulation into material-ontological regions. What does this transformation of phenomenology mean for our problem of feeling and emotions?

¹⁷ Hua 37, p. 71.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 72.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ Husserl-scholar Ulrich Melle reminds us that sensations are through and through the consciousness of something, even though not in the full sense. Cf. MELLE, Ulrich. *Husserls deskriptive Erforschung der Gefühlserlebnisse*, p. 87.

As a consequence of introducing the pure I, also the passivity belonging to feelings is interpreted by Husserl as a primordial, zero-mode of the I's activity. Just as a simple registration of something (*Erfassung*)²¹ represents the lowest form of the I's activity, so the receptivity of impressions or feelings is the lowest form of emotivity. At this zero level of activity, the full-fledged apperceptive acts are being built. In the *Ideas*, Husserl studies this constitution and the corresponding distinctions both in the realm of objectifying acts and in the parallel realm of emotional acts and acts of willing.²²

Methodically, the static phenomenology takes place in the *Ideas*: Husserl analyzes mental experiences in their cross-section. Although he examines the constitution of space, the body and the world, the starting point is still a static foundation, inherited from Cartesian metaphysics through Brentano: representation – judgment – will. Constitutive investigation is embedded in this hierarchization.

In the second part of the *Ideas*, emotions and affectivity are assigned to the natural level of the constitution of the personal I, without clarifying the 'naturalness' itself. The ontological division corporeal nature – mental being – spiritual being is taken for granted, as well as the dualism of spirit (the egoic activity) and matter (natural passivity). Affectivity, with all its history of habitual and affective tissue, constitutes the natural side of the personal I.²³ There are constituted tendencies and tendentious pathways of both pleasure and avoidance of unpleasant in the context of mental life.²⁴ However, at the same time it is possible to change the attitude and put this natural side into brackets and thus subject it to the examination as a purely noetic-noematic correlation. Then, the subject of such an inquiry is not the natural I, but the transcendental I. For the I, his own sphere is a spiritual freedom, the spontaneity 'I act freely of myself' in the intentional field of consciousness, 'I am turning to something' or 'I am turning away from something'.

An important shift in the *Ideas* is the study of historicity of the pure I. The I also includes his own history, retentional wealth from the past that again enters into the protentions and projections focused on the future;²⁵ and also persistent habits and active decisions. This issue of habits prepares the insight into the fact that meaning has its own history, its layers, which cannot be penetrated by static analysis. And that is because static analysis is applied retrospectively only from the result of the constitution.

Genetic phenomenology

Insight into the historical nature of the constitution means a major change in phenomenology. Even the a priori has its own historicity: the constitution itself is constituted and stratified in this constitution. We can reveal layers of meaning, ruptures or inversions in the continuity of the duration of the respective ideal meaning. Instead of the static constitution examining the rigid foundation within a living experiential whole, in the genetic approach, we come to a genetic constitution. In this procedure, analytical sections proceed discretely

²¹ Cf. *Ideen II*, p. 24.

²² Cf. HUSSERL, Edmund. *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. I. Buch, Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie*. Haag: Nijhoff, 1976, § 95.

²³ Cf. *Ideen II*, p. 338.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 312–313.

²⁵ Cf. *Ideen II*, p. 398.

together with discovery of individual sedimented layers of meaning.²⁶ Each of these layers has a different temporality and different modes in which it enters into a constitution. Husserl is led by a teleological vision (or belief?): the layer or sediments are arranged in unity so that through the various rays of meaning goes the total meaning. In such an approach, starting point from the zero-level of sensations turns out to be a relic of empiricism.

Analyses concerning passive synthesis

The *Ideas* deal with the issues of ontological articulation of the world on the domain of the transcendental I. In contrast, the object of Husserl's analyses of passive syntheses from 1918–1926 are synthetic events occurring without the I's activity.²⁷ As a part of the project of genetic phenomenology, these analyses are characterized by penetrating the darkness without thematic intentional contents that is no illuminated directly by the rays of the I. In his analyses, Husserl is guided by the idea of analogy among all intentional events in the broadest sense.²⁸

Every living presence (*lebendige Gegenwart*) has an affective zero horizon. Already the primordial core retention-urimpression-protention is conceived by Husserl as primordial form of affection: "The primordial source of all affection lies (...) in urimpression."²⁹ Thus, the living present is not neutral in the sense of some detached observing. The living present has a fluctuating attentive relief, articulated in the noticed background from which themes emerge in the foreground.³⁰ At the same time, associative connections are constituted in the form 'awaking the past by virtue of the presence'. And in these associative connections the higher formations of meaning are constituted in the rhythm of resonance, dissonance and consonance. And these higher formations enter and penetrate the full-blooded intentional acts.³¹

The First philosophy-lectures

As we already saw, in *Logical Investigations*, emotional mental experiences as well as free acts of willing were interpreted as non-independent moments founded on objectifying acts. In contrast, in the lectures from 1923–1924, entitled *The first philosophy (Erste Philosophie)*, the perspective is reversed. The plan of static foundation is now replaced by that of *intertwining (Verflechtung)* or *mutual penetration (Durchdringen)* of different kinds of acts. Theoretical acts are intertwined with emotional acts, acts of willing, of evaluation, of liking

²⁶ More consequentially to the genetic phenomenology cf. BERNET, Rudolf, KERN, Iso, MARBACH, Eduard. *Edmund Husserl. Darstellung seines Denkens*. Hamburg: F. Meiner Verlag, 1996, ch. VII.

²⁷ As we will see, the expression "without the I's activity" does not mean "without the I". For even the passive events occur in the I's consciousness and they belong to the egoic life.

²⁸ László Tengelyi is right in pointing that Husserl uses the model of objectifying for understanding passive syntheses. Instead, Tengelyi suggests the model of the event that is not connected with the objectifying acts. Cf. TENGYELI, László. *Welt und Unendlichkeit: zum Problem phänomenologischer Metaphysik*. Freiburg im Breisgau: Alber, 2014, p. 191–193. We cannot go further into this problematic, only notice that in this approach, Husserl's idea of parallelism and teleology of intentional acts remains out of attention. Moreover, the category of the event (*Ereignis*) does not to be borrowed from Heidegger's thinking or the French phenomenology. It is used by Husserl already in his early time-analyses, it is not unknown, as Tengelyi suggests.

²⁹ Hua 11, p. 168.

³⁰ Hua 11, p. 167.

³¹ Hua 11, p. 406–410.

etc. and all of these acts can be again be subject to theoretical interest.³² From this point of view, the static analysis according to individual act species is only an abstract analytical instrument.

The study of historicity opens of a specific problematic for phenomenology itself as situated into a specific tradition, namely the European tradition. The model of the inter-monadic community is for Husserl the philosophical community. That is, the community explicitly living in the self-determination of life in absolute self-responsibility (*Selbstverantwortung*), i.e. responsibility for their Selves. Such a perspective may seem strange. Husserl made it clear that it was the idea of such a community that constitutes the identity of Europe as such. Europe stands and falls with the discovery of the possibility of philosophy as an effort for the freedom from prejudice.

In this approach, acts of willing appear as governing and objectifying theoretical acts as subordinate. Husserl surprisingly says that the intellect is only a servant (*Diener*) of the will.³³ This Husserl's statement makes sense only in the light of the already mentioned intertwining of acts and the study of the life of the historical inter-monadic community, the essence of which includes the will to be responsible. So the statement of superiority of the will over the intellect does not mean a return to voluntarism. The will cannot be abstractively isolated. The will is the will to know (*Erkennenwollen*).³⁴

Lectures on Ethics from 1920–1924

The observed changes in the phenomenological scope can also be seen in Husserl's research on ethics from the 1920s. Here, too, the optics is extended in the sense that what matter is no longer just a study of the constitution of object, but also the pure 'I' with his life. Husserl notes that our experience is constantly immersed in the background of sensory feelings which constitute general feeling (*Gefühlsmilieu*) and general attunement (*Stimmung*), which provides an overall coloring to all our life as a stream of particular situations.³⁵ Thus, in contrast to *Logical Investigations*, we can see a *reversion* in genetic approach: the starting point is no longer *primarily* the apperception structure of intentional experience, but the living 'I' and his living world.

C-Manuscripts

The already mentioned *general attunement* is intentional, but it does not involve a relation to the intentional objects, but to the horizon of the world, and in the immanence of consciousness it enters into the constitutive sequence of the egoic life. Apperceptively articulated experience takes place on the more original affective ground of this attunement:

³² "Trotz dieser Mannigfaltigkeit von Besonderungen des Erkennens oder Urteilens im weitesten Sinne bleiben noch andere Gattungen von Ichakten reichlich genug übrig, so jederlei Lieben und Hassen, Gefallenhaben und Missfallenhaben, Wünschen, Begehren, Wollen. Andererseits liegen alle solche Ichfunktionen nicht nebeneinander, sondern durchdringen sich." Hua 8, p. 193.

³³ "Jedenfalls, *Erkenntnisvernunft ist Funktion der praktischen Vernunft, der Intellekt ist Diener des Willens.*" *Ibid.*, p. 201.

³⁴ Cf. *ibid.*

³⁵ "Jedes durch neue Empfindungsdaten erregte Gefühl findet seine Resonanz und beeinflusst das gesamte Gefühlsmilieu, das zur Einheit der Stimmung zusammengeht." Hua 37, p. 327.

“Vorgegebenheit ist das Gelten-im-Voraus aus Tradition in einem allerweitesten Sinne. Dazu gehört auch Apperzeption, und letztlich sinnlich erfahrende Apperzeption, vermöge deren, was in der Umwelt unbeachtet da ist als Wahrnehmungshintergrund, in jedem Fall der aktuellen Wahrnehmung schon seine Bekanntheitsform hat und seine Seinsgeltung als da und dort, oder vermöge deren jede aktive Erfahrung auf einer Affektion beruht, die schon die Antizipation eines weltlichen Seins und des Seins in einer offen-endlosen Welt in sich trägt.”³⁶

Whereas in *Logical investigations* and in *Ideas* the feelings and emotions were either parallel or dependent on objectifying acts, in genetic approach, on the contrary, they are immersed in the original affective horizon: “*Alle Gegebenheit hat ihren Affektionshorizont*”.³⁷ And this affective horizon is the horizon of the world: “Ständige Vorgegebenheit der Welt für mich sagt nicht, es ist Welt wirklich, sie ist in Wahrheit für mich, sondern ich bin in einem ständigen Welt-in-Geltung-Haben und in einzeln verlaufenden Akten, die Einzelnes als in der anonymen Weltgeltung Beschlossenes dadurch, dass ich davon ‚affiziert werde‘, in der und jener Weise thematisch machen, Sondermeinungen bildend, in denen das Einzelne als soseiendes Reales bekannt (wird), oder als so von mir handelnd umgestaltetes Reales neue Eigenschaften erhält usw.”³⁸

In analyses of passive syntheses, we have seen that Husserl works with the idea of a zero-affective horizon. The I’s being-present (*Dabei-sein*) is articulated affectively. In so-called *C-Manuscripts*, Husserl’s late analyses of internal time-consciousness from 1929–1934, the problem of self-affection (*Selbstaffektion*) and self-action (*Selbstaktion*) is added to this being-present. The I’s affects and acts do not only relate to the constitution of the objective world, but they also affect the ‘I’ alone.³⁹ In them, the ‘I’ is pre-thematically aware of himself.

In conclusion: the unfinished phenomenology of instincts

In his late period, Husserl developed the phenomenology of instincts with the ambition to unify his hitherto separate phenomenological starting points. Each of his phenomenological projects operated on an abstractive level, examining one of the layers of transcendental constitution. The project of the phenomenology of instincts connects the genetic stratification of the temporal forms of consciousness up to the highest spiritual level of thinking, freedom and love. The basis for this phenomenology is the reduction to the hyletic-kinesthetic level.⁴⁰ Humanity living and self-preserving in the European tradition is thought of as a teleological stratification of meaning from the level of instinct to willing affects and actions.

In the genetic approach, hyletic data no longer has an atomic, unanalyzable nature, as it appeared in the analysis of objectifications, in which the starting point from sense-giving acts were the sensations. The sensations themselves are already imbued with meaning, although not in the sense of objectifying acts. The meaning-articulation is given to them by synthetic events, which are based on bodily kinesthesia.

³⁶ Hua 34, p. 302.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 449.

³⁹ HuaM 8, p. 185.

⁴⁰ Hua 42, p. 39.

This approach relativizes the former notion of hyletic data as meaningless and standing in opposition to spiritual, sense-giving acts. For the division into the egoic and non-egoic (*Ichfremde*)⁴¹ moment does not mean that hyle is something outside or pre-existent before the 'I'. Paradoxically, at the level of the living body and his affections, what is non-egoic is itself egoic and vice versa, what is egoic is itself non-egoic. Perhaps this statement will be clearer if we recall the well-known motif of chiasm in the *Ideas II*, where touching finger can function as both touching and touched, according to the tactile perspective we will prefer.⁴²

In Husserl's late phenomenology, the difference between the touch and the touched, or more generally, between the affection and the affected is reduced to its original level: *the living 'I' is this difference itself*. And if we hold that *this living 'I' is the philosopher himself*, we can see that every new phenomenological beginning is both a self-action and self-affection embedded into the *European* history of transcendental subjectivity, the constitution of which is still on the march.⁴³ From this point of view, Husserl's phenomenology is a self-reflection in which the mutual penetration and completion of the philosopher and his philosophy in the sense of Plato's portrait of philosophical life as a peculiar kind of a detour (*periodos*).

But what about us who, after the event of Husserl's phenomenology, are in question: *is there still Europe?*

⁴¹ Hua 42, p. 28.

⁴² *Ideas II*, p. 141 [146nn.].

⁴³ Hua 15, p. 45.

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(Doc. Mgr. David Rybák, Ph.D., odborný asistent Katedry občanské výchovy a filosofie UK PedF.)